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SEARCHING FOR REPUTATION: RECONCILING FREE SPEECH AND
THE “RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN”
Jeffrey Abramson*
This article offers a comprehensive assessment of the tension
between First Amendment law and the European Court of Justice’s
decision in 2014 granting individuals the right to have search
engines “forget” certain personal information about them. While
the ECJ decision is vague on the boundaries of a “right to forget,”
it correctly locates a problem of “too much speech” for speech’s
own good as well as for the goods of privacy and reputation. Three
developments combine to create the problem of too much speech.
The first is the over-extension of commercial speech doctrine far
beyond its modest beginnings. The Roberts Court has suggested
that inherited distinctions between the importance of political and
commercial speech are in jeopardy, as is the entire notion that the
First Amendment distinguishes between the importance of speech
on public and private matters. The second is the sweeping
characterization of data as if it were already speech, no matter
how raw and inarticulate the data. The third is the judicial
treatment of search engine speech as if rankings are mere
expressions of opinion entitled to heightened First Amendment
protection against allegation of bias. I conclude by offering modest
prescriptions for containing what counts as commercial speech
and for setting expiration dates on how long personal information
remains online as a way to introduce some amount of “forgetting”
into the Internet while not going as far as the ECJ did.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Speak now or forever hold your peace.
–Book of Common Prayer (1662)
Never seek to tell thy love / Love that never told can be.
–William Blake (posthumously 1863)
The more total society becomes . . . the greater the idle chatter.
–Theodor W. Adorno (1952)
Online experience will start with birth, or even earlier. Virtual
identities will supersede all others, as the trails they leave
remain engraved online in perpetuity.
–Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen (2013)
For speech to be speech, it has to stand in contrast to
something—silence, pauses, gaps, action maybe, thinking before
speaking, contemplation, reflection, isolation, seclusion, being out
of touch, beyond the reach of communication or not writing this
present Article. 1 In a tradition dating back at least to Aristotle,
speech stands as a distinct human activity–distinct not only
because speech differentiates us from other animals, 2 but also
because speech is an exceptional occasion even for human beings.
Speech according to Aristotle is “the peculiarity of man.”3
By contrast, speech today is our default position.4 We are more
likely to be in reach of a communications device at all times than
1

“We require such solitude as shall hold us to its revelations when we are in
the streets and in palaces; for most men are cowed in society, and say good
things to you in private, but will not stand to them in public. But let us not be the
victims of words.” Ralph Waldo Emerson, Society and Solitude in 7 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 7–8 (Harvard Univ. Press,
2007).
2
Even a cat trained to say a few sentences in English does not speak. See
Miles v. City Council, 710 F.2d 1542, 1544 (11th Cir. 1983) (denying First
Amendment protection to “Blackie the Talking Cat” on grounds that cats lack
personhood).
3
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 11 (R. F. Stalley ed., Ernest Barker trans., 1995).
4
As the Roberts Court has noted, “modern cell phones . . . are now such a
pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars
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not.5 We write and email more messages than previous generations
sent and received letters. 6 We conduct approximately twenty
billion discrete online searches each month.7 We read more entries
on Wikipedia in a day than were read on Encyclopedia Britannica
in a year. 8 We communicate more with Facebook friends than
anyone could with friends in real space.9 We are in contact with the
might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.” Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
5
Ninety percent of American adults own a cell phone and 64 percent own a
smartphone. 44 percent “have slept with their phone next to their bed because
they wanted to make sure they didn’t miss any calls, text messages, or other
updates during the night.” Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH
INTERNET PROJECT, http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/mobile-technologyfact-sheet (last visited June 2, 2015). The Pew study found that similar
percentages of white, African-American and Hispanic adults own cell phones
and smartphones. Id.
6
“‘[T]he number of worldwide email accounts is expected to increase from
. . . 3.1 billion in 2011 to nearly 4.1 billion by year-end 2015.’” Matthew
Sundquist, Online Privacy Protection: Protecting Privacy, the Social Contract,
and the Rule of Law In the Virtual World, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 153, 161
(2012).
7
Google ranks first with nearly 65 percent of the U.S. market. Bing handles
19.7 percent on Microsoft sites, followed by Yahoo with 13 percent of the
search market. comScore Releases February 2015 U.S. Desktop Search Engine
Rankings, COMSCORE (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.comscore.com/Insights/
Market-Rankings/comScore-Releases-February-2015-US-Desktop-SearchEngine-Rankings. Google controls 92 percent of the search market in Europe.
James Kanter & Mark Scott, Europe Sees Violations of its Antitrust Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2015, at B1. Google recently changed its corporate name to
Alphabet, but the search subsidiary will still be known as Google. See James B.
Stewart, Alphabet with a Capital G, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2015, at B1.
8
Wikipedia is among the top ten most visited Internet sites. Yochai Benkler,
A Free Irresponsible Press: WikiLeaks and the Battle over the Soul of the
Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 375 (2011).
9
Aimee Lee Ball, Are 5,001 Facebook Friends One Too Many? N.Y. TIMES,
May 30, 2010, at ST 1. Facebook establishes the cut-off for friends at 5,001.
Facebook has 1.44 billion users worldwide, as of 2015. Vindu Goel, Facebook
Reports Quarterly Results Dominated by Shift to Mobile and Video, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 23, 2015, at B3. In addition to logging in to Facebook, persons use their
Facebook identity as a kind of identity card to log in some ten billion times
annually to other social apps. Vindu Goel, Facebook to Let Users Limit Data
Revealed by Log-Ins, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2014, at B1. One out of every six
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famous on Twitter10 and the anonymous on Yelp.11 Instagram has
300 million monthly users who click on posts eighteen times a
day.12 In the online world, all of these exchanges flow with a speed
and volume that is almost beyond comprehension. Americans used
2.3 trillion voice minutes in 2012 and sent six billion text
messages, or 69,635 every second.13
Not coincidentally, governments and corporations spend more
time monitoring our speech, giving the weaving of the World Wide
Web a different meaning. 14 This astounding amount of
minutes that Americans spend online is spent on Facebook. Vindu Goel, How
Facebook Sold You Krill Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2014, at B4.
10
As of April of 2015, Twitter reported having 308 million monthly average
users. Vindu Goel, Ad Growth Disappoints at Twitter; Shares Fall, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2015, at B1. These users spent an average of 7.2 minutes a day on
Twitter’s mobile apps. Vindu Goel, World Cup Gave Twitter a Big Burst in
Traffic, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2014, at B1.
11
Yelp had a monthly average of 142 million visitors during the first quarter
of
2015.
About
Yelp,
YELP,
http://www.yelp-press.com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=250809&p=irol-press (last visited Aug. 29, 2015). Citing lack
of jurisdiction, one state supreme court overturned lower court rulings that
would have required Yelp to disclose the identity of anonymous reviewers in
connection with a defamation suit. Justin Jouvenal, Yelp Won’t Have to Turn
Over Names of Anonymous Users After Court Ruling, WASH. POST (Apr. 16,
2015, 5:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/yelp-wont-haveto-turn-over-names-of-anonymous-users-after-courtruling/2015/04/16/aeb322c6-e39a-11e4-b510-962fcfabc310_story.html.
12
Vindu Goel, It’s Official: Instagram is Bigger than Twitter, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 10, 2014, 12:18 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/itsofficial-instagram-is-bigger-than-twitter. Facebook owns Instagram. Kashmir
Hill, Ten Reasons Why Facebook Bought Instagram, FORBES (Apr. 11, 2012,
5:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/04/11/ten-reasonswhy-facebook-bought-instagram/.
13
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35–36, n.56 (D. D.C. 2013). The
average cell phone user checks the device 150 times a day. Max Chafkin,
Cyborgs Won’t Be the Only Ones to Love Next-Gen Wearables, FAST CO. (Sept.
9, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://fastcodesign.com/3035233/innovation-by-design2014/cyborgs-wont-be-the-only-ones-to-love-next-gen-wearables.
14
“Like any web, it can wrap itself around you . . . . [E]verything we do . . .
[is] broken down into data, . . . mined in invasive expeditions in the name of
commerce and government surveillance.” E. Doctorow, The Promise – and
Threat – of the Internet, THE NATION, Dec. 4, 2013, at 4, 5.
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communications begs the question: do we have “too much
speech?”
In 2014, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), the highest
court of the European Union, gave an emphatic yes to this
question,15 widening the gap between American First Amendment
jurisprudence and European law. The European Union now
requires search engines to “forget” certain information about an
individual when it is “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant
[to any public purpose]” and when that information is harmful to
the privacy and reputation of the person.16 This so-called “right to
have information forgotten” has its roots in the decisions of several
European nations after World War II to codify a right to human
dignity that even speech must respect.17
In this Article, I offer a qualified defense of the European
Court’s view that the digital spread of speech threatens important
social norms that we try to capture in terms such as dignity or
privacy. However, the ECJ decision left the right to have
information “forgotten” so vaguely defined as to provoke welldeserved criticism that the ruling requires internet services, upon
request, to purge search results of anything embarrassing to
individuals. I will explore these difficulties taking into account the
tension between the way new technologies empower us with more
speech opportunities and yet disempower us by ceding control over
everything we say to the copying, replicating, and transmitting of
data, the banal along with the intimate. In the digital world, any
15

Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. ___, ¶93, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&docid=152065.
16
Id.
17
The most well-known example is the provision in German law that
prohibits Holocaust denial. See Winfried Brugger, The Treatment of Hate
Speech in German Constitutional Law (Part I), 4 GERMAN L. J. 1, 3 (2003).
Article I of the Basic Law of Germany reads: “Human dignity shall be
inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [Constitution] May
16–22, 1949, art. 1 (Ger.). See Carl Friedrich, The Political Theory of the New
Democratic Constitutions, 12 REV. OF POL. 215, 217 (1950).
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item posted may live on forever. 18 We must adjust our social
interactions accordingly.19
In suggesting that we may have too much speech, I have both a
legal and a normative argument in mind. The legal argument turns
on whether every gathering and transmission of data, no matter
how inarticulate and commercial in nature, counts as speech for
First Amendment purposes. Recent court decisions draw analogies
between rankings “expressed” by search engines and opinions
published in traditional media. Just as the press cannot be sued for
a “false” or “biased” opinion, so a search company cannot be liable
for its subjective opinions about which sites provide the most
relevant answers to users’ queries.20 Moreover, personal data that
used to be protected by privacy laws becomes protected instead
within the First Amendment rights of marketers to buy and sell.21 I
argue that such uses of the First Amendment call into question the
basic settlement of post-New Deal constitutional law. That postNew Deal settlement distinguished between the deference courts
owe to state economic regulation and the scrutiny courts should
give to laws restricting fundamental noneconomic liberties, such as
freedom of speech. 22 As what we categorize as speech becomes
near ubiquitous in our information society, the distinction between
suspect regulations of speech and permissible regulation of
commercial data enterprises collapses.
18

But cf. Jill Lepore, The Cobweb, NEW YORKER, Jan. 26, 2015, at 34–41
(explaining how posts on the Internet often disappear). Lepore reports on efforts
to archive all Internet material, noting that if and when that happens, “the past
will be inescapable, which is as terrifying as it is interesting.” Id. at 41. For
information on the life cycle of information on the Internet, see Meg Leta
Ambrose, It’s About Time: Information Life Cycles, and the Right to be
Forgotten, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 369, 372 (2013).
19
In his short story, Funes the Memorious, Jorge Luis Borges explored how
burdened speech became in the presence of the title character who would
remember forever everything said to him. For an exploration of how social
interaction, as well as self-understanding, change when remembering, and not
forgetting, becomes the norm, see VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE
VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 112–127 (2009).
20
See infra Part IV.
21
See infra Part III.
22
See infra Part III.C.
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From the normative point of view, I offer two related
arguments. First, I argue there may be too much speech for
speech’s own internal good.23 Second, I argue there is too much
speech for the good of external values such as reputation, privacy
and individual control over personal information.24 More speech is
not always good for speech itself, since more speech for some
threatens less effective speech for others;25 speedy speech does not
comport with accuracy; 26 and speech that is always “on” may
recede into so much banal chatter or background noise. 27 My
argument is not that more speech has to corrupt discourse. There
are contexts in which a more speech, the better approach enriches
our democracy, our economy, our individual autonomy, and our
search for knowledge.28 I argue only that we should be concerned
23

“The great obstacle to consumers getting what they want will no longer be
that there are too few products available; it will be that there are too many. The
new system, by reducing barriers to entry, will make much more material
accessible to consumers. Some of it will be good; most will be junk.” Eugene
Volokh, Symposium, Emerging Media Technology and the First Amendment:
Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L. J. 1805, 1815 (1995).
24
I am indebted to Professor Oren Bracha, my colleague at the University of
Texas School of Law, for reading an earlier draft and suggesting I sharpen the
distinction between the internal harm too much speech does to itself and the
external harm it does to important values other than speech.
25
“[S]tate-created advantages not only allow corporations to play a dominant
role in the Nation’s marketplace, but also permit them to use ‘resources amassed
in the economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace.’” Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659
(1990), overruled by, Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S 310,
363–65 (2010).
26
Approximately forty percent of Facebook accounts purporting to be from a
Fortune 100 company are fakes. Goel, supra note 12. See also Cass R. Sunstein,
Symposium, Emerging Media Technology and the First Amendment: The First
Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L. J. 1757, 1765 (1995) (“[Some speech
imposes] risks of sensationalism, ignorance, failure of deliberation, and
balkanization.”).
27
See
Twitter
Study, PEAR ANALYTICS
1,
4–5
(2009),
http://www.pearanalytics.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/Twitter-StudyAugust-2009.pdf (finding 40.1% of tweets randomly sampled during a two week
period were babble).
28
For positive contributions of Twitter to news reporting, see Chrystia
Freeland, Why #RussiaInvadedUkraine Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2014, at
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about the emergence of short and quick speech practices that favor
a new generation of sound “bytes” over the Aristotelian regard for
the slower, intermittent but distinct capacity speech gives us to
shape our world according to norms and ideals that could not exist
apart from speech tied to reason and reflection.
In addition to harming speech, more speech sometimes harms
outside or competing values. Consider the following familiar
symptoms of democratic dysfunction: campaigning has become
almost permanent, to the detriment of governance;29 money speaks
for some donors but saps public confidence in electoral integrity;30
the same technology that makes speech abundant makes state or
corporate surveillance of that speech also abundant;31 hatemongers
troll online, using anonymity to undermine civility 32 and

A21. See also David Carr, The View from #Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
2014, at B1 (“[I]n a situation hostile to traditional reporting, the crowd sourced,
phone-enabled network of information that Twitter provides has proved
invaluable.”).
29
William A. Galston, The “Permanent Campaign” = Perpetual Paralysis,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2014, 7:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/williamgalston-the-permanent-campaign-perpetual-paralysis-1414539559.
30
“[T]he financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of
corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral process.”
Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 394 (2010) (Stevens,
J. dissenting).
31
Jack Balkin, Symposium, Freedom of the Press: Old-School/New-School
Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2305–06 (2014) (“[The] battle cry
of cyberactivists in the early twenty-first century was . . . that ‘information
wants to be free.’ We now understand that information also wants to be
collected, collated, analyzed, and used for surveillance and control.”). For the
connection between too much speech and too much surveillance, see infra Part
VI.A.
32
See Farhad Manjoo, Web Trolls Winning, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2014, at
B1; Rebecca Mead, The Troll Slayer, NEW YORKER, Sept. 1, 2014, at 30–38
(noting vicious online misogyny in the U.K.); Musetta Durkee, Note, The Truth
Can Catch the Lie: The Flawed Understanding of Online Speech in In re
Anonymous Online Speakers, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 773, 811, n.188 (2011)
(citing Article documenting hateful comments posted on a digital tribute site for
a 17-year-old suicide victim).
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sometimes openly making threats. 33 In addition, the variety of
cable television channels and of Internet websites accommodates
the tastes and politics of us all, but often on separate channels or
sites, to the loss of common references.34 Google speech controls
online reputations that chain link persons to their worst moments.35
Power and control over personal information flows from
individuals to a handful of large technology companies that
monetize private data into advertiser-valued information.36
I do not mean to suggest that only one model of speech—
rational and engaged in reciprocal conversation—is worthy of First
Amendment protection. Neither politics nor ordinary social
conversation takes place in a seminar room, and all manner of
slogans, symbols, and chants are clearly protected speech, even
when tied to the mobilizations of emotion rather than reason.37 My
argument is not meant to winnow out such recognizable forms of
speaking, but rather it aims to address the question: what is the best
understanding of the communication that search engines facilitate?
Is Google a speaker entitled to First Amendment protection? Or is
a search engine simply a tool, albeit a magnificent one, that
furthers the speech of others? What would it even mean to say
search engines “speak” to us? 38 Is a search engine our advisor?
Does it have opinions? Is Google a publisher or editor like the New
33

On the issue of what constitutes posting a true threat on the Internet, see
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015) (overturning the
defendant’s conviction for threatening his ex-wife online and holding that
criminal convictions for online threats require evidence that a defendant used
words for the purpose of making a threat or with actual knowledge that the
words would be viewed as a threat).
34
See Jeffrey Abramson, Second-Order Diversity Revisited, 55 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 739, 755–56 (2014).
35
See infra Part V.
36
See infra Part III.
37
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that the First
Amendment protects the emotional as well as ideational component of speech
such as taping the phrase “Fuck the Draft” on a jacket).
38
True, one can talk back to a search engine in ways one could not talk back
to a television in the old days. But no one thinks a smoke detector and alarm
system are engaged in protected free speech when they communicate with one
another.
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York Times? These questions are still new enough to have no
definitive answers.39
My project in this Article is largely diagnostic, though I do
conclude with a set of prescriptions. I hope to describe the problem
I call “too much speech” persuasively enough to force
reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s libertarian commitment to
the more speech, the better norm as if the phrase was selfjustifying. As important as expanding the reach of speech is, so too
is protecting the power of people to shelter themselves from
misuses of personal data to the detriment of privacy, reputation and
dignity. My diagnosis is that free speech principles are being
strategically used to cut off debates about Internet governance
before they even begin. It is important to locate these normatively
misplaced uses of the First Amendment so as to open room for
reasonable Internet regulations.
I begin in Part II by tracing the development of First
Amendment law from an era of too little speech to our current era
of too much speech. The era of too little speech was characterized
by censorship, punishment of dissenters, and technologically
enforced scarcity in the early days of broadcasting. In the face of
these obstacles, the rallying cry justifiably became the more
speech, the better. 40 The maxim captioned many of speech’s most
historic victories, and it took firm root both in judicial doctrine and
the popular imagination. Sometimes it spawned disagreement, as
over applications of clear and present danger doctrine.41 In time, it
achieved a working consensus on many issues.42
39

See Oren Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
1629, 1646–53 (2014).
40
See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
41
Disagreement over clear and present danger doctrine prompted the famous
Holmes-Brandeis dissents, beginning in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919). Through the first half of the 20th century, clear and present danger was a
speech-restrictive doctrine. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
(upholding convictions of Socialist Party members); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding convictions Communist Party members). But
by 1969, clear and present danger doctrine became more speech-protective as a

12
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In Part III, I argue that the growing equation of data with
speech, no matter how raw and inarticulate the data is, threatens to
upset the always precarious balance between maintaining privacy
while facilitating the free flow of information. The fact that so
much personal information about us is now in the databases of
corporations and governments is a large reason why too much
speech is a problem.
In Part IV, I discuss the special case of search engines and
speech. “Search” has quickly become one of the major forces for
knowledge and commerce on the Internet. Against the argument
that search engines “speak,” I will argue that search engines are
extraordinarily valuable tools for facilitating the speech of others.
But like other tools or conduits of communication, they are not
entitled to the heightened First Amendment protection courts are
now giving them. Too much speech for search engine companies
threatens the speech of web publishers who fare poorly in search
rankings, perhaps unfairly at times. We need to prevent the First
Amendment from being used to shield search engine companies
against charges of bias or deception.
In Part V, I turn to the ECJ decision on “the right to be
forgotten” as a way of reconciling speech and reputation. In Part
VI, I argue that too much speech paradoxically spawns too much
monitoring and surveillance of that speech.
In Part VII, I turn from diagnosis to prescription. If we are to
undo speech corruption of discourse and democracy, I suggest
unanimous Court in a per curiam decision held that advocacy of opinions that
fell short of attempting to incite imminent violence or lawless action was
protected speech. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
42
So-called “conservative” judges such as Justice Scalia have accepted that
even flag burners are protected by the more speech, the better approach. See,
e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416–17 (1989). So-called “liberal” justices
such as Justice Ginsburg have accepted that buffer zones outside abortion
facilities cannot be so wide as to prevent protesters from effective opportunities
to speak. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2537–41 (2014). Both sides
swallowed hard and included even gay-baiting protests within hearing of the
funeral of a fallen soldier as within the protections offered by the norm of the
more speech, the better. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 457–58 (2011).
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several remedies but two in particular. First, not all information
exchanged during commercial transactions is entitled to First
Amendment protection. In 1976, the Court first recognized the
doctrine of commercial speech, striking down a state law that
prohibited pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription
drugs.43 That decision sensibly focused on the considerable health
interests consumers have in obtaining prescription drugs at
affordable prices.44 Nothing in the decision committed the Court to
turning the First Amendment into protection of all advertising, for
example price ads for tobacco products.45 Nor must the doctrine of
commercial speech expand into a doctrine protecting the free
speech rights of the Googles, Facebooks, and Amazons of the
Internet to “speak” to third parties with the personal data we
provided them to buy a product. However, this is exactly what is
happening, to the degradation of free speech principles.
A second prescription is to follow Europe’s lead by developing
a more robust concept of individual dignity. Those sympathetic to
the critique of too much speech generally rely on notions from
privacy or libel law to balance claims of free speech against claims
of reputation. But privacy regulations can only do so much in an
online environment where we seemingly consent to have our
personal data gathered, stored, and transmitted. The ECJ’s
particular prescription of giving individuals a right to have online
information about them “forgotten” may be flawed, but it does
point us in the right direction. The prescription for the ills of too
much speech has to be one that restores significance to the act of
43

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770–71 (1976).
44
Id. at 755, 763–64.
45
But see Lorrillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 570–71 (2011)
(striking down restrictions on tobacco advertising). Consider also the dispute
over a Congressional law requiring cigarette companies to post a graphic
warning on all cigarette packs. One court of appeals struck down the regulations
the FDA promulgated pursuant to the statute. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
Food & Drug Admin., 696 F. 3d. 1205, 1221–22 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Another court
of appeals upheld the Congressional statute against a facial challenge. Discount
Tobacco & Lottery Co. v. Food & Drug Admin, 674 F.3d. 509, 551 (6th Cir.
2012).
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consenting to making personal information public. Individuals who
have no choice but to consent if they are to use the services of
online platforms have not volunteered to surrender power over
their personal data in any meaningful way. Persons without power
to control what they reveal about themselves in public are persons
stripped of a basic human dignity.
Complaints about too much speech are as old as the Tower of
Babel.46 At a time of continuing repression abroad,47 we do well to
acknowledge the considerable advances an open Internet makes
possible at home. But as in the biblical story where seven years of
plenty gave way to seven years of famine, we can handle the
opportunities created by our bounty of speech well or poorly. As a
nation we responded to the rise of railroads with laws against rate
discrimination.48 We responded to the rise of radio and television
by creating a Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”),
charged with regulating the airwaves in the public interest,49 and a
Corporation for Public Broadcasting to take some bandwidth out of
private hands.50 In line with that tradition, the FCC recently moved
to regulate Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) as public utilities
required to provide access to the Internet in nondiscriminatory
ways.51 The adoption of so-called net neutrality rules is a hopeful
46

Genesis 11:1–9. For an old gripe from 1710, see Jonathan Swift, The
Examiner, in 1 THE WORKS OF JONATHAN SWIFT 300 (1880) (“[F]alsehood flies
and the truth comes limping after it.”). A version usually but wrongly attributed
to Mark Twain is that “a lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth
is putting on its shoes.” See Benkler, supra note 8, at 348 (citing to wrongful
attribution of quotation to Twain in Thomas Friedman, Too Good to Check,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2010, at A33).
47
See, e.g., Keith Bradsher & Paul Mozur, Sealed Tight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
22, 2014, at B1 (describing China’s “great firewall” restricting access to Google
and other web sites); see also Edward Wong & Didi Kirsten Tatlow, Beijing,
Blocking Social Media Sites, Tries to Keep a Tight Lid on News of Unrest, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2014, at A10 (describing China’s propaganda department’s
directive to delete any mention of the disorder in Hong Kong).
48
Interstate Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 49-41, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
49
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151ff (2012).
50
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. § 396 (2012).
51
Rebecca R. Ruiz & Steve Lohr, F.C.C. Votes to Regulate the Internet as a
Utility, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2015, at B1. For cable and telecom company
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sign that governance is maturing on the Internet. The concern in
this Article is whether similar regulations for the public good will
develop for the interactive computer services—the Googles,
Facebooks, Twitters, Instagrams and the like—running on the
Internet.
II.
FROM TOO LITTLE SPEECH TO TOO MUCH SPEECH
Before there was too much speech, there was too little speech.
The classic cases that gave rise to modern First Amendment law
centered on the harms to democracy when government prevented
dissenters from criticizing public policies or advocating unpopular
points of view. 52 The birthing process was slow and painful.
Although the Supreme Court initially gave government wide
leeway to punish dissent during time of war as an obstruction of
the war effort, it slowly shaped a more protective paradigm.53
The major prong of the speech protective paradigm, as it took
shape from the end of World War I through the Vietnam War, was
the principle of content neutrality. Simply put, the principle is that
“government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” 54 Law can
regulate expressions that threaten to incite imminent violence or
unlawful conduct55 or fall within historic categories never deemed
to have speech value, such as obscenity, libel, or fighting words.56
resistance to the FCC’s proposal to regulate ISPs as public utilities, see Steve
Lohr, F.C.C. Plans Strong Hand to Regulate the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
2015, at B1.
52
For an account of imprisonment of persons who spoke against American
entrance into World War I, see PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE
ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 128–32 (1979).
53
Compare the Court’s initial record of affirming convictions of anti-war
protesters, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), with the Court’s
eventual use of neutrality principles to protect a protester who wore a jacket
displaying the words, “Fuck the Draft.” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971).
54
Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
55
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
56
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942), the Court
noted that obscenity, libel, and fighting words were categories of speech outside
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Consistent with neutrality toward messages, law can provide for
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations of speech. 57
Likewise, government may justify incidental effects on speech that
result from pursuing compelling state interests that have nothing to
do with the content of speech.58 However, the concept of neutrality
bars government from justifying prohibitions on speech by
declaring a given message harmful in and of itself.59
At first, the theory driving speech protection located the value
of speech in its service to the ends of democratic government.
Justice Cardozo referred to speech as “the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other freedom.”60 Justice
Brandeis wrote in similar means-ends fashion about the connection
between free speech and self-government.61 Before Brandeis and
Cardozo, Thomas Jefferson had laid out the same defense of
speech as a necessary condition of democracy.62
Like judges, philosophers at first placed special value on the
worth of political speech. “The primary purpose of the First
Amendment,” Alexander Meiklejohn wrote in 1948, “is . . . that all
the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which

the protections of the First Amendment. Although this remains true, the Court
has scrutinized obscenity, libel, and fighting word statutes to make sure they do
not intrude into areas of constitutionally protected speech. See R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386–87 (1992).
57
See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575–76 (1941).
58
See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968).
59
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416–17 (1989).
60
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
61
“Those who won our independence believed . . . that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would
be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
62
“If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union, or to change its
republican form, let them stand undisturbed, as monuments of the safety with
which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.”
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Inaugural Address, in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 1, 3 (1897).
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bear upon our common life.”63 The plausible argument ran from
more speech on public issues leading to more informed citizens
and in turn to better democracy. 64 However, although the
democratic argument was highly protective of political speech,
critics faulted it for being underinclusive when it came to
protecting speech about private matters.65
In time the classic battles for more speech opened a second and
broader front against too little speech. The idea took hold that
speech had intrinsic as well as instrumental value. Individual selfexpression became an end in itself, since no individual was truly
free who lacked power to shape the contents of his or her mind.66
The linguistic shift from “freedom of speech” to “freedom of
expression” or better still “freedom of self-expression” was a sign
of the theoretical shift behind the phrases.67 The Court has cited the
inherent value of individual autonomy to extend the protection of
the First Amendment to such nonpolitical matters as commercial
advertising, 68 art, 69 or nude dancing as art. 70 Sometimes,
63

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 88–89 (1948).
64
These theories tended to leave the end product of “better democracy”
vaguely defined. John Stuart Mill taught that pluralism in speech is what enables
truth to defeat falsity in democracies. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in 18
COLLECTED WORKS OF J. S. MILL 228–260 (J. M. Robson ed., 1977). Skeptics
about objective truths argue that tolerance of speech makes representative
democracy achieve “truth” only in the sense of making decisions more
responsive to public opinion. ROBERT DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST
DEMOCRACY 10–11 (1982).
65
See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr. “Book Review,” 62 HARV. L. REV. 891
(1949). For one scholar who follows that part of Meiklejohn’s theory that sees
free speech as serving the “central democratic goal [of] reflective and
deliberative debate,” see Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1762.
66
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970)
(positing individual “self-fulfillment” as the sovereign First Amendment value).
67
Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 303, 306 (1991) (asserting that “freedom of expression is a public
good”).
68
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770–71 (1976).
69
See Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS
169 (2012).
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commentators attempted to stretch the democratic argument to
explain the connection between individual and collective meanings
of self-rule.71 Other times, for instance in Justice Scalia’s remarks
made about the First Amendment’s “obvious” protection of
Jackson Pollock’s most abstract paintings, 72 the Justice finds no
need to locate some putative service of abstract art to politics.
In recent years, the Court has adopted an increasingly
libertarian philosophy about free speech, holding that content as far
removed from the workings of political democracy as snuff
movies73 and violent video games74 are nonetheless protected forms
of self-expression.75 The Court’s recent campaign finance decisions
offer the clearest example of its libertarian tilt. In Citizens United
v. Federal Elections Commission,76 the Supreme Court overruled
70

Compare Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75–77 (1981) (holding
that the First Amendment protects live nude dancing against a zoning law
prohibiting adult stores from featuring it), with Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S.
560, 570–71 (1991) (upholding requirement that nude dancers wear some cover
over breasts and genitals).
71
Meiklejohn responded to critics by saying that the self-government
rationale explained why we protect art and literature, since they help voters
acquire “the knowledge, intelligence, [and] sensitivity to human values . . .
which, so far as possible, a ballot should express.” Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 256; see also Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763–64 (advertising prescription drug prices
contributes information on a matter for public debate).
72
For this example, see Tushnet, supra note 69, at 169.
73
United States. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
74
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 950 (2011).
75
As opposed to the libertarian emphasis on maximizing the free speech
rights of individuals, egalitarians invoke the connection between speech and
democracy to defend state legislation promoting equality in speech in certain
situations. In the era of broadcasting, for instance, egalitarians defended equal
access rules and the Fairness Doctrine. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969). For the contrast between libertarian and egalitarian views
on free speech, compare Eugene Volokh, Symposium, Cyberspace and Privacy:
A New Legal Paradigm? Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1091–93 (2000) [hereinafter Troubling Implications], with
Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term, Comment: Two Concepts of
Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 145–46 (2010).
76
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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its own precedents77 and declared that the more speech, the better
approach included the right of corporations and unions to use their
treasuries to fund independent electioneering communications right
up until Election Day.78 Citizens United repudiated any egalitarian
notion that the speech of independent corporate expenditure groups
could be limited out of concern for leveling the electoral playing
field. 79 In a recent interview defending the Citizens United
decision, Justice Scalia specifically invoked “the more speech, the
better” norm as the sovereign First Amendment principle.80
Money’s metamorphosis from thing to speech is characteristic
of the too much speech era. Reasonable persons disagree on
whether there is too much money in politics or whether corporate
contributions and independent expenditures have as much potential
to corrupt the political process as critics argue.81 This Article does
not seek to resolve those disagreements; rather its concern is with a
more general phenomenon that the transmogrification of money
into speech represents.

77

See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660
(1990); see also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003)
(noting that the government has an interest in preventing the public from losing
faith in the electoral process that results from moneyed speech drowning out the
speech of others).
78
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66.
79
“[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign
to the First Amendment . . . .” Id. at 349–50 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976)).
80
Matt Vasilogambros & Sarah Mimms, Scalia Defends Citizens United
Decision, Reflects on Term in Rare TV Appearance, NATIONAL JOURNAL (July
18, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/scalia-defends-citizensunited-decision-reflects-on-term-in-rare-tv-appearance-20120718.
81
While there is no doubt that the amount of money spent by independent
groups during campaigns has vastly increased in recent years, see Ashley
Parker, Outside Spending Drives a Deluge of Political Ads, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2014, at A1, there is little evidence that big donors are backing winning
candidates, see Andrew Mayersohn, Four Years After Citizens United: The
Fallout, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.opensecrets.org/
news/2014/01/four-years-after-citizens-united-the-fallout/.
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In the same era that the Court extended First Amendment
protection to money as speech, it also bestowed the First
Amendment’s protection on commercial advertising for the first
time. 82 This broadening of what counts as speech continues apace
on the Internet, permitting search engine companies to invoke the
First Amendment as a shield against legal regulation of their
business. More generally, a world of too much speech comes into
existence whenever commercial data migrates en masse into the
free speech column, to the detriment of the autonomy persons once
enjoyed to control access to personal information.83
Two questions loom. The first is how to distinguish
commercial speech, largely protected against government
interference, from commercial conduct subject to reasonable legal
regulations.84 The second is whether commercial speech is equal in
value to political speech.85 The answers to these two questions will
go a long way to determining whether or not we live in an era of
too much speech.

82

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770–71 (1976). Prior to this decision, many states restricted advertising by
professions, such as by lawyers. See generally Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
433 U.S. 350 (1977) (overturning restrictions).
83
For argument to this effect, see infra Parts III.A and III.B.
84
Compare Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (stating
that regulation of marketing of prescription drugs is a restriction on speech),
with IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52–54 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding
similar regulation in another state is a regulation of conduct, not speech).
85
Compare Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n,
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (subjecting restrictions on commercial speech to
intermediate scrutiny as opposed to the strict scrutiny that restraints on political
speech receives), with Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2664 (“A
‘consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far
keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue.’”); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Commentary: Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 555,
557 (“It is impossible to develop a system of free expression without making
distinctions between low and high value speech, however difficult and
unpleasant that task may be.”).
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III.

DATASPEAK: THE OVEREXTENSION OF COMMERCIAL
SPEECH DOCTRINE
In the world of big data—also known as metadata—algorithms
crawl through haystacks of raw information looking for new
needles of knowledge. 86 We tell machines something about our
preferences every time we buy a product, and they speak back to
us with predictions about our future preferences. 87 They
communicate a profile of our preferences (after removing personal
identifiers) to advertisers interested in reaching in the aggregate
persons with particular buying tastes. 88 Elsewhere, workplace
scientists slice and dice data about employee performance to
develop tests for hiring and promotion. 89 The National Security
Agency (“NSA”) sits on its own haystack of dialed telephone
numbers. 90 When necessary, the agency combs through it to see
who might have called a person who in turned called the number of
a terrorism suspect. 91 In short, there is a significant amount of
dataspeak going on.92
Data enthusiasts turn to the First Amendment to protect the free
flow of data from obstacles that privacy regulations are meant to
create. 93 Even the most enthusiastic supporters of information
86

According to IBM, “Big data is being generated by everything around us at
all times. Every digital process and social media exchange produces it. Systems,
sensors and mobile devices transmit it.” What is Big Data, IBM,
http://ibm.com/big-data/us/en/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2015).
87
See, e.g., Bracha, supra note 39, at 1649 (posing the example of a search
where the user tells the search engine her tastes in movies and the search engine
makes recommendations for future movies to watch).
88
See, e.g., Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, https://privacy.google.com/aboutads.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2015).
89
Don Peck, The Future of Work, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 2013, at 73.
90
See infra Part VI.A.
91
Spencer Ackerman, NSA Warned to Rein in Surveillance as Agency Reveals
Even
Greater
Scope,
THE
GUARDIAN
(July
17,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/17/nsa-surveillance-house-hearing.
92
“There’s been a real sea change in the past five years, where the quantities
have just grown so large—petabytes, exabytes, zetta—that you start to be able to
do things you never could before.” Peck, supra note 89, at 80.
93
See Troubling Implications, supra note 75, at 1091–94; Jane R. Bambauer,
Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63 (2014).
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freedom concede the need for a narrow band of privacy, protecting
sensitive information of the sort contained in medical94 or student
records.95 However, they suggest that most data is not intimate in
these ways and should be fair game in a society devoted to the free
flow of information. 96 They turn to the First Amendment with
arguments that data is speech.97
Treating commercial data gathering as a First Amendment
activity is at the core of the problem of too much speech.
Economic activities that should be subject to reasonable state
regulation become free speech activities, apparently as important
to the values of the First Amendment as political speech.98
This Section will argue that commercial speech doctrine,
sensible in its origins, is being put to uses for which it was never
intended. In 1976, a group representing persons with conditions
requiring use of prescription drugs filed suit against the Virginia
Board of Pharmacy. At issue was a board regulation that prohibited
licensed pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription
drugs.99 It is telling that the Court refrained from announcing any
free speech right in pharmacists to advertise.100 Instead, the Court
emphasized the free speech rights of the audience to receive the
advertising. 101 The Court stressed that consumers’ interests in
receiving prescription drug price information was related to “an
interest in their own health that was ‘fundamentally deeper than a
94

Federal law does protect the privacy of a patient’s health card records
maintained by health service providers or health plans. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a7c(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2012).
95
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)
(2012).
96
For a statement of how Acxiom, a leading data-mining company, collects
and markets data about us, see Make Data Work for You,
https://www.aboutthedata.com, ACXIOM, (last visited Aug. 29, 2015).
97
See infra Part III.B.
98
Troubling Implications, supra note 75, at 1092 (noting speech about “daily
life matters” is as important as any other speech).
99
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 753 (1976).
100
Id. at 753, 770–71.
101
Id.
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trade consideration.’”102 Presumably, the case would have been less
compelling had the consumers been seeking price information in
order to comparison shop for shampoos.103 Little in the Supreme
Court’s original 1976 decision to include commercial speech
within the protection of the First Amendment justifies the
extensive speech protections that interactive commuter services
and social platforms now seek.
A. Not All Communications Tools Speak
Some ground clearing is first necessary. Not everything that
communicates information is speech, even broadly conceived. 104
To take an example offered by constitutional scholar Robert Post,
navigation charts “communicate” but no court treats them as
entitled to First Amendment protection. 105 Given the context in
which they are used, charts function as products or tools subject to
the normal rules of product liability in cases of inaccuracy.106 For
example, a blender functions to stir and mix and does not function
as an expressive piece of glass sculpture. It could be a sculpture
designed to speak to an individual, but context would point out the
difference between tool and sculpture. Or to take one of Tim Wu’s
102

Id. at 755 (quoting trial court decision below); id. at 763–764 (“Those
whom the suppression of prescription drug price information hits the hardest are
the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged.”).
103
Id. at 764 (“[N]ot all commercial messages contain . . . a public interest
element.”).
104
Acts and conduct, and even silence and not doing an act, communicate. As
communications theorist Paul Watzlawick and colleagues put it, “One cannot
not communicate.” P. Watzlawick et al., Some Tentative Axioms of
Communication, in PRAGMATICS OF HUMAN COMMUNICATION - A STUDY OF
INTERACTIONAL PATTERNS, PATHOLOGIES AND PARADOXES 48–71 (1967). See
also Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (“It is possible to find some
kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for example,
walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall—but such a
kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First
Amendment.”).
105
See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035–36 (9th Cir.
1991) (analogizing an aeronautical chart to a compass).
106
Robert C. Post, Essay: Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 1249, 1254 (1995).
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examples in Machine Speech, the sound of a car alarm might be
speech if it were put in a song, but generally the sound functions as
an automated warning device, not as expressive output for its
human designer.107
Similar to Post’s navigation charts, Google Maps or MapQuest
function as tools for getting from A to B. Obviously, these sites
process and communicate information sought by users. But users
do not converse with the map’s designers, as if the designers were
engaged in conveying some substantive message. 108 If courts
obliterate this difference between speech and tools that facilitate
the speech of others, they would be engaging in a new kind of
“Lochnerizing” in which freedom of speech replaces the old liberty
of contract as a way to shield commercial enterprises from state
regulation.109
B. Not All Raw Data is Speech
Jane Yakowitz Bambauer is a leading advocate of the position
that “for all practical purposes, and in every context relevant to the
current debates in information law, data is speech.” 110 For
Bambauer, “[e]xpanded knowledge is an end goal of American
107

Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1524–25 (2013).
In Rosenberg v. Harwood, 2011 WL 3153314 (D. Utah 2011), a woman
sued Google, claiming her reliance on Google Maps led her to step into a
freeway and suffer an injury. Google defended by citing its free speech rights as
a publisher. Id. The court did not reach this issue but dismissed the claims on the
alternative grounds that Google owed no duty of care to the plaintiff. Id.
109
For a discussion of how free speech principles can be misused to strike
down economic regulations in a manner reminiscent of the disapproved Lochner
era, see infra Part III.C. One example of how the doctrine of commercial speech
can overextend the First Amendment came in a federal court decision,
fortunately overturned, striking down the National Do Not Call Registry as an
unconstitutional infringement on telemarketing. See Mainstream Mktg. Servs.
Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 283 F. Supp. 2d 115, 1167–68 (D. Colo. 2003),
rev’d, 358 3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2003). Another troubling First Amendment
decision, one that remains good law, involved the striking down of a regulation
that forbade telephone companies to use customer data for unauthorized
advertising purposes. See U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F. 3d 1224, 1232–33
(10th Cir. 1999).
110
Bambauer, supra note 93, at 63.
108
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speech rights, and accurate information . . . provides the fuel.”111
Access to raw data is crucial to the creation of new knowledge
since data is nothing other than “information . . . captured and
recorded into a fixed, man-made format.”112 It is data that led us to
revise wrong notions that too much salt causes hypertension113 or
that stress causes ulcers. 114 For Bambauer, every restriction on
data’s movement is an obstacle to knowledge and autonomy.115
Bambauer casts a jaundiced eye at most privacy regulations
because “they are deliberately designed to disrupt knowledge
creation.”116 In her view, carefully drafted privacy laws might be
constitutional, but only if they survive heightened scrutiny under
the First Amendment. 117 Every privacy restriction raises a
constitutional objection, many of them fatal. 118 Those privacy
norms that cannot survive such scrutiny should be “casualties”119 in
the battle for freedom of information against retrograde forces of
mind regulation marching under the banner of privacy.120
However, Bambauer’s analysis bumps into a major problem.
Although she notes in passing that “knowledge is power,”121 she
pays scant attention to the “who” of data as opposed to the “what.”
To those who fret about creditors using Big Data to size up a loan
applicant, Bambauer’s response, true to the speech answering
111

Id.
Id. at 65.
113
Id. at 102.
114
Id. at 93.
115
Id. at 105.
116
Id. at 63.
117
Id. at 87; id. at 106 (“[D]ata should not be relegated in all cases to a lower
form of protection.”); id. at 114 (“[G]overnment cannot limit the collection or
dissemination of data in order to achieve certain preferred ends without a
compelling interest to do so.”).
118
Id. at 109 (recognizing that her analysis “will lead to some consequences
that are difficult to accept,” including “the leveling of popular consumer privacy
laws”).
119
Id. at 112.
120
Id. at 87 (“Data privacy laws have the unabashed goal of limiting, and
shaping, what the government’s constituents can know.”).
121
Id. at 108.
112
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speech approach, is that the customer can turn the tables and use
the same data to shop for creditors. 122 This might be true if the
predicate—that consumers have the same access to Big Data as
banks—were true for any but the most savvy and credit-worthy of
consumers. The rest of the consumers live in a world of
information asymmetry. 123 Even Bambauer acknowledges that
certain hotel pricing sites know more about visitors—for instance
whether they use a Mac computer—than visitors know about them,
and that these sites use their information advantage to steer Mac
users to more expensive hotels. 124 Bambauer dismisses those
concerned about such examples as “[t]he equality camp.” 125 She
scoffs at “academic . . . illuminati [who] tend to overreact to
corporate power” 126 and offers her calming conclusion that “a
person who is categorized in one instance will be the categorizer in
the next and will rightly expect the liberty to judge and form his
own opinions.”127
One can accept Bambauer’s general view that factual data is
indispensable to free thought without accepting her specific
argument that unregulated corporate power over data gathering is
necessary to, or even always consistent with, fact-driven inquiry.128
For instance, Robert Post has argued that laws prohibiting the
122

Id. at 102.
See, e.g., Leah Hunt-Hendrix & Astra Taylor, ‘Tech’ is Political—How We
Respond to it Needs to be Just as Political, THE NATION (May 27, 2015),
http://www.thenation.com/article/tech-political-how-we-respond-it-needs-bejust-political/.
124
Bambauer, supra note 93, at 116; see also Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 245 n.27 (2014) (citing Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz,
Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels, WALL ST. J., (Aug. 23, 2012, 6:07 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023044586045774888226673258
82.html).
125
Bambauer, supra note 93, at 107.
126
Id. at 108.
127
Id. at 102.
128
One does not have to cast corporations as the only villains in the
marketplace of ideas to have concerns about, say, the commitment of tobacco
companies historically to factual inquiry about the safety of their product. See
Philip Shenon, New Limits Set Over Marketing for Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
18, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/washington/18tobacco.html.
123
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public disclosure of private facts, a tort in most states, 129 serve
rather than hinder the marketplace of ideas by promoting rules of
civility that permit individuals to engage with one another. 130
Violations of the rules of civility, Post remarks, are intrinsically
disrespectful and serve as a way of silencing persons.131 The lack of
respect places the injured person “outside of the bounds of the
shared community” and hence outside of participation in public
speech as an equal.132
Enforcement of privacy norms is society’s way of reaffirming
the dignity of the person as a full member of the community.133 Or
as anthropologist Robert Murphy puts it, “[i]nteraction is
threatening by definition, and reserve, here seen as an aspect of
distance, serves to provide partial and temporary protection to the
self . . . . [The] privacy obtained makes other roles more viable
. . . .” 134 Privacy lets us know that our personal and intimate
relationships are secure even as we enter the public arena.135
Legal scholar Paul Schwartz has raised specific concerns that
disclosure of a person’s genetic information, however accurate,
may relegate certain members of society into a “biological

129

See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy
Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L. J. 967, 971–72 (2003). The tort of
public disclosure of private facts occurs when a person or persons widely
discloses a private matter that is “highly offensive to a reasonable person” and
“is not of legitimate concern to the public.” Id. at 971 (quoting Restatement of
Torts (Second) § 652D (1977)).
130
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in
the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 959 (1989).
131
Id. at 967.
132
Id. at 968.
133
Id. at 968, 971 (explaining that common law privacy is a normative
concept that expresses “forms of respect deemed essential for social life.”).
134
Sundquist, supra note 6, at 158 (quoting Robert F. Murphy, Social
Distance and the Veil, 66 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 1257, 1259 (1964)).
135
Id. at 173–74; see also Kate Murphy, We Want Privacy, but Can’t Stop
Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2014, at Sunday Review 4 (explaining that being
under public observation triggers arousal mechanisms that “drain cognitive
resources [and] . . . inhibit[] . . . our ability to explore our thoughts and feelings
so we can develop as individuals.”).
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underclass.”136 Schwartz notes that genetic test results, taken out of
context, can support a wrong-headed genetic determinism
characteristic of past eugenics movements. 137 And while perhaps
data can answer data in the emerging market for genetic
information, “[t]he individual to whom these data refer faces a
high price when attempting to explain the significance or
insignificance of the information, and these explanatory costs can
exceed the value of unrestricted disclosure to society.”138
In Bambauer’s worldview, almost all data, whether about
matters of public or private concern, can be useful in the creation
of knowledge. 139 But, in The Virtues of Knowing Less, law
professor Daniel Solove builds on the work of Hannah Arendt,
Erving Goffman, and other scholars to argue that details about our
intimate and private selves are not necessarily a reliable guide to
the different selves we all play in public.140 This difference between
private selves and public lives is crucial to the Supreme Court’s
sliding scale approach to libel, where the more private the person,
the greater “the strength of the legitimate state interest in
compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to
reputation.”141
Bambauer does accept that individuals have a narrow right to
privacy that she calls seclusion, which is essentially the right not to
136

Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care
Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 29 (1997).
137
Id. at 28.
138
Id. at 30. Schwartz refers to this as a “cost of explanation” problem
necessitated in real markets by the less than rational behavior of employers.
Thus, as opposed to the critiques of privacy as economically inefficient offered
by leading scholars such as Judge Richard Posner or Richard Epstein, Schwartz
defends nondisclosure of certain sorts of medical information as economically
efficient. See id. at 23–30 (summarizing and criticizing the Posner-Epstein
position on privacy).
139
Bambauer, supra note 93, at 63.
140
Solove, supra note 129, at 1037–38.
141
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974); see also Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)
(explaining that plaintiffs may recover presumed and punitive damages when
false and defamatory statements raise no matters of public concern).
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have information gathering going on inside your house or during
intimate conversations. 142 But she insists that the geography of
seclusion be kept narrow, since the farther one is from home, the
more one is in the ever-expanding grip of “the public.”143 Once we
use a credit card, we are in the information commons. Thus, one of
the “casualties” of her narrowing privacy to seclusion would be
President Obama’s proposed consumer privacy bill of rights for the
Internet, insofar as that bill talks expansively of “American
Internet users [] hav[ing] the right to control personal information
about themselves.”144
Bambauer is one among many scholars who takes aim at the
elevation of speech about public affairs over speech about private
matters.145 In particular, she jettisons any wholesale assignment of
commercial speech to the lowest levels of First Amendment
protection.146 For her, such hierarchies empower government to tell
persons what it is important to know about. Bambauer is
committed to the notion that all information is created equal.
C. Data about Prescriptions: The Return of Lochner?
Consider a recent dispute over the boundaries of commercial
speech.147 For our purposes, it is serendipitous that the case returns
to a fact pattern that gave birth to the doctrine of commercial
speech: information about prescription drugs.148
142

Bambauer, supra note 93, at 111–12.
Id. at 112 (extending seclusion outside the home has “severe effects on the
liberty of others”).
144
Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Plan to Protect Privacy in the
Internet Age by Adopting a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (Feb 23. 2012),
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/fact-sheetplan-protect-privacy-internet-age-adopting-consumer-privacy-b.
145
See, e.g., Troubling Implications, supra note 75, at 1095 (“[T]he public
concern test is theoretically unsound.”); id. at 1050 (“The difficulty is that the
right to information privacy - my right to control your communication of
personally identifiable information about me - is a right to have the government
stop you from speaking about me.”).
146
Bambauer, supra note 93, at 106.
147
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
148
See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
143
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Pharmaceutical representatives engage in a marketing practice
known as “detailing.” 149 Detailers are pharmaceutical
representatives who obtain from pharmacies or health plans
detailed information about the prescribing practices of a particular
physician.150 The detailers then use this information to customize
their marketing, doctor by doctor.151
Vermont passed a law that contained three prohibitions on
access to prescription information. 152 The first prohibited entities
such as pharmacies or health insurers from selling prescriberidentifying information. 153 The second prohibited these entities
from disclosing prescriber-identifying data for marketing purposes,
while permitting its use for other purposes.154 The third prohibited
pharmaceutical manufacturers from using the information to
market their products to physicians. 155 Vermont asserted state
interests in medical privacy and in keeping down health care costs
by preventing marketers from influencing doctors to prescribe
expensive brand-name drugs over generic alternatives.156
The Supreme Court found a fatal flaw in the law.157 Instead of
enacting a general privacy ban on disclosure of prescriberidentifying information, the state went after only those sales,
disclosures, or uses that contained content the state frowned upon
(marketing) and a disfavored viewpoint (that held by the detailers
doing the speaking to physicians).158 Since the law violated core
free speech principles of content and viewpoint neutrality, 159 the
Court subjected the law to more heightened scrutiny than a
149

Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659.
Id.
151
Id. at 2659–60.
152
Id. at 2660; see also VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 4631(d) (2015).
153
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660.
154
Id.
155
Id. For lucid analysis of the Vermont law, see Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Constitutional Constraints on State Health Care & Privacy Regulation After
Sorrell v. IMS Health, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 855–80 (2012).
156
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670–71.
157
Id. at 2663–64.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 2663–64, 2667.
150
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commercial regulation might otherwise have received and struck
down the law.160
What if Vermont had passed a more general or neutral ban on
disclosure of prescriber prescription identification?161 If raw data is
already speech, as Bambauer maintains, then such a law would
have to survive heightened scrutiny by convincing the court that
the privacy interests at stake were compelling and the restrictions
narrowly tailored to meet those interests. In Sorrell the Court did
not feel it necessary to reach that issue, since the lack of content
and viewpoint neutrality was already dispositive of the case. 162
However, in dicta Justice Kennedy staked out the more speech, the
better approach that augurs ill for privacy regulations. 163 Justice
Kennedy argued that data about the prescribing habits of
physicians is factual.164 And “[f]acts . . . are the beginning point for
much of the speech that is most essential to advance human
knowledge and to conduct human affairs. There is thus a strong
argument that prescriber-identifying information is speech for
First Amendment purposes.”165
If in the future Justice Kennedy’s views move from dicta to
holding, then we can expect companies in the business of
monetizing data to push for more free speech protection against
privacy laws. In Sorrell, the information being disclosed went to
the doctor’s professional habits, not his personal life or those of
patients. 166 The Sorrell case left for another day the looming
question of how to adjust the inherited free speech paradigm of
“more information is always good” to the marketing of metadata
that discloses truly personal information.167
160

Id. at 2672.
The Court specifically noted that such a neutral law would pose different
questions. Id. at 2668.
162
Id. at 2667.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. (emphasis added).
166
Id. at 2665, 2668.
167
The Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
does protect the privacy of a patient’s health card records maintained by health
161
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In a case from New Hampshire that was similar to Sorrell, the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit offered a different analysis of
data’s claim to First Amendment protection. 168 The First Circuit
regarded the law as a reasonable regulation of the conduct, not the
speech, of pharmaceutical representatives.169 These representatives
were engaged in selling prescription drugs just as other
salespersons were engaged in selling beef jerky. 170 The analogy
was unfortunately flippant, but it illustrated the court’s point that,
in the context of the case, the data sought served no normative
purposes that would qualify the information as speech.171 As the
court put it, the true concern of the pharmaceutical representatives
was that the market for their services would dry up if they had no
access to prescriber-identifying data.172
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Sorrell picked up on the First Circuit
approach, going even further by spotting what, following Justice
Breyer, may be called the Lochner elephant in the room. 173 Ever
since the New Deal, there has been a more or less stable
constitutional settlement based on the principle that courts owe
more deference to legislative regulation of economic affairs than

service providers or health plans. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c(a)(3)(B)(ii) (2006).
However, with the proliferation of software apps run on mobile devices such as
Fitbit or Apple’s SmartWatch, many persons now store health data in places not
covered by HIPAA. One wonders whether Bambauer would oppose new privacy
laws restricting what private vendors can do with personal medical data stored
on such devices. See Smartwatches and Weak Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 2014, at A26. According to the Wall St. Journal, most of the nearly 40,000
health apps for wearable devices on the market today make money by selling
user fitness data to marketers. Elizabeth Dwoskin and Melinda Beck, As Apple
Moves Into Health Apps, What Happens to Privacy?, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 9,
2014, 7:21 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/09/09/as-apple-moves-intohealth-apps-what-happens-to-privacy/.
168
IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).
169
Id. at 45, 50–54.
170
Id. at 53.
171
Id. at 45, 50–54.
172
Id. at 53.
173
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2673 (2011) (Breyer, J.
dissenting).
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they do to regulations of noneconomic matters. 174 But this basic
distinction collapses when courts characterize state laws regulating
pharmaceutical marketing as state regulations of speech. 175 The
Sorrell majority mistakenly reasoned as if Vermont had imposed
restrictions on what pharmaceutical representatives could say to
doctors in favor of their message. In fact, the state restricted only
disclosure of prescriber data that the pharmaceutical companies
wanted in order to customize their pitches. 176 Against their
commercial interest stood the state’s significant interests in treating
that data as private and confidential, given by physicians to
pharmacies and health insurers for one purpose only.177 The Sorrell
decision is solicitous of marketing as speech but less attuned to the
norms of medical practice and how writing a prescription is hardly
a doctor’s invitation to engage in a dialogue with marketers. In one
world, doctors “speak” to pharmacists for the benefit of their
patients only; in another world, doctors as well as patients lose
control over personal information, as it becomes a commodity to
be sold and purchased.
D. The Ever-expanding Bounds of the Public
Some will respond to the argument in the preceding section by
objecting that information has always functioned as a tradable
commodity. Nineteenth century readers thought the penny press

174

The most famous statement of this distinction comes in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
175
“[G]iven the sheer quantity of regulatory initiatives that touch upon
commercial messages, the Court’s vision of its reviewing task threatens to return
us to a happily bygone era when judges scrutinized legislation for its
interference with economic liberty. History shows that the power was much
abused . . . . See Lochner v. New York . . . .” Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2679 (Breyer,
J. dissenting). Several commentators have echoed Justice Breyer’s warning that
the Roberts Court is using freedom of speech in ways similar to the ways the
infamous Lochner era courts used liberty of contract to strike down commercial
regulations. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First
Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1211–17 (2005).
176
Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2662, 2668.
177
Id. at 2683 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
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worth the price, if only to get the latest shipping news. 178 This
response is true as far as it goes, but the observation does not go as
far as supercomputers do in collecting data beyond the bounds of
anything that was previously possible. 179 Our normative
commitments to free speech and a free press were never meant to
cater to a world where the treatment of every disclosure of every
byte of information as valued speech would be to override the very
boundaries on public discourse that people rely on in throwing
themselves into it.180
Beginning with the work of John Rawls, contemporary theories
of justice measure the fairness of basic institutions against shared
principles of public reason. 181 Publicly reasoned arguments are
those that do not depend on any ultimate moral, religious, or
spiritual commitments that may matter much to us in private life
but which cannot be rationally defended to those who believe in
different ultimate values. 182 However, these theories of justice
presume that, outside of public deliberations and debates, a private
realm of speech goes on and flourishes.183 Private discourse does
not belong in public debates, and publicity should not imperially
invade our private lives. An ever-expanding notion of what is
public threatens the realm of the private that democratic theories of
justice take as a starting point.
IV.
TOO MUCH SPEECH FOR SEARCH ENGINES?
In 2003, Search King, a small advertising placement company,
alleged that Google deliberately lowered Search King’s Google
rankings as a way to kill off ad competition. 184 Search King’s
178

For the history of the penny press see MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING
THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 12–60 (1978).
179
See supra notes 4–12 and accompanying text.
180
See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.
181
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 397–98 (1999).
182
Id.
183
See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 148 (Penguin,
1977).
184
Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193
(2003).
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business model was to locate web sites highly ranked by Google
and pay these sites to link with its clients’ webpages, thereby
raising the Google rankings of its clients’ pages. 185 As the
middleman that grew these “link farms,” Search King profited.186
Google guards against such “search optimization” firms, regarding
them as attempts to game the system.187 When its Google ranking,
as well as those of its partnered sites, suddenly declined, Search
King found its business model threatened.188
A. Search Engines as Opinion Speakers
In moving successfully to dismiss the complaint, Google
argued that it did not matter what its reasons were for ranking
Search King and the partnered sites as it did.189 After all, Google
maintained, its search results were just its opinions about the
relative worth of websites when it came to providing answers to a
user’s query.190 The rankings, like any ratings, were neither true nor
false, but a classic example of protected speech—a speaker (here
the algorithm) publishing its opinions about a matter of public
interest.191 Given Google’s First Amendment status as an opinion
185

Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1327, 1354–55
(2008).
186
James Grimmelmann, Google Replies to Search King Lawsuit, LawMeme
(Jan.
9,
2004),
http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php?name=
News&file=article&sid=807,
available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/
20040612081746/research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php?name=News&file=a
rticle&sid=807.
187
For an analysis of use of search-engine optimization techniques to “game”
the system, see, e.g., Heather Lloyd-Martin, Secrets of Successful Search Engine
Optimization, (March 5, 2003), http://searchenginewatch.com/sew/news/
2047911/secrets-successful-search-engine-optimization#.
188
Search King, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27193 at 3–4.
189
Id. at 6, 13.
190
Id. at 6; see also Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 1445, 1477 (2013) (noting search results express opinions as to a
webpage’s usefulness or quality).
191
In an earlier case, the Supreme Court had held that “a statement of opinion
relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false
factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection.” Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990).
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speaker, a trial would be pointless, Google argued, since there was
no such thing as evidence that could prove a mere opinion true or
false, objective or biased.192 The trial judge agreed, going so far as
to state that an algorithm’s rankings “cannot be considered
wrongful even if the speech is motivated by hatred or ill will.”193
Other courts have reached similar conclusions in extending
traditional protections for opinion to the evaluations contained in
Google search results.194 In testimony before Congress, Google’s
CEO, Eric Schmidt, said, “[s]earch is subjective, and there’s no set
of ‘correct’ search results.”195 One court has alternatively protected
Google by holding that free speech principles protect the company
from being compelled to speak by indexing any particular
website. 196 Google continues to take action against other alleged
search optimization schemes by deliberately lowering their
ranks.197

192

Google argued for dismissal of the complaint since “[t]he PageRank values
assigned by Google are not susceptible to being proved true or false by objective
evidence. How could SearchKing ever ‘prove’ that its ranking should ‘truly’ be
a 4 or a 6 or a 8? Certainly, SearchKing is not suggesting that each one of the
billions of web pages ranked by Google are [sic] subject to another ‘truer’
evaluation? If it believes so, it is certainly free to develop its own search
services using the criteria it deems most appropriate.” Amy N. Langville and
Carl D. Meyer, GOOGLE’S PAGERANK AND BEYOND: THE SCIENCE OF SEARCH
ENGINE RANKINGS 53 (Princeton 2011).
193
Search King, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 27193 at *13.
194
Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 439–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(noting Chinese search engine has First Amendment right to block “prodemocracy” sites as exercise of editorial judgment); Krinsky v. Doe, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 231, 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding online poster’s comments,
“while unquestionably offensive,” were “pure opinion” and hence “were not
actionable under [state] defamation law.”); Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google,
Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806, at *20–*21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16,
2007) (“Google itself holds out PageRank as an opinion . . . .”).
195
Testimony quoted in James Grimmelmann, Search Engines, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 868, 872, n. 16 (2014).
196
Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007) (holding
the First Amendment protects Google’s right not to run a website’s ads).
197
See Josh Blackman, What Happens if Data is Speech? 16 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 25, 30 (2014) (recounting Google’s decision first to demote then to reinstate
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Control over search rankings matters to the free flow of
information, since a site that does not get indexed by a search
engine might as well not exist.198 There is such a dramatic drop off
from clicks on sites displayed on page one of search results
compared to clicks on page two sites that companies fear being
exiled into digital Siberia.199
In the U.S., decisions such as Search King make it difficult
even to reach questions about possible bias in search engine
rankings. Once a court categorizes these rankings as opinions, the
protections of the First Amendment shelter search engines from
regulatory oversight of the content of their speech. And yet, the
analogy of algorithmic output to opinion speech is tenuous. At
most, the opinion of the algorithm is something weak like “We
think these are the sites you will find most useful to answer your
query.” 200 This is a far cry from Google offering its own
substantive opinion about the content of the sites indexed.
Google’s service seems more like a tool without any opinions of its
own, an index useful to persons engaged in speech activity of their
own.201
In a white paper commissioned by Google, Eugene Volokh and
Donald Falk follow the lead of the Search King decision by folding

the rankings of a website on rap lyrics suspected of using improper search
optimization techniques).
198
Id. at 29–30 (“[Google’s] ability to immediately and pervasively
‘disappear’ a site is significant. If you don’t play by the rules, your ranking can
be destroyed, and you are effectively invisible.”); see also Oren Bracha & Frank
Pasquale, Federal Search Commission: Access, Fairness, and Accountability in
the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1150, 1165–66 (2008).
199
See Lastowka, supra note 185, at 1342 (stating that the average user rarely
travels beyond first page of results); Bracha and Pasquale, supra note 198, at
1165 (citing to sources that find a drop off in users already occurring for the site
listed second rather than first).
200
See, e.g., Benjamin, supra note 190, at 1461.
201
I take this distinction between speech and communication tools from Wu,
supra note 107, at 1506–07.
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Google Search into the inherited legal protections of opinion. 202
They do so by drawing an analogy between the first page of search
results and the first page of a traditional print newspaper. Just as
newspapers select stories important enough to appear on page one,
so search engines crawl through web pages to select the most
useful answers to a query, displaying the top ones on its equivalent
first page of results. 203 But, as Tim Wu argues, the analogy is
misleading. A newspaper publishes stories as its own speech
product, written by their reporters or selected by editors to appear
as a story whose content the newspaper stands by.204 By contrast,
Google does not endorse the results it indexes or claim that Google
is speaking through these websites.205
Even if one accepted that search engines offer opinions, the
opinions at issue could still be demonstrably false or biased. Here
James Grimmelmann’s distinction between normative and
descriptive opinions is helpful.206 A search engine’s display of top
results to a query is a normative opinion, insofar as it depends on a
host of subjective factors about how to compare the utility of sites,
but the displayed list also purports to be a true description of what
the search engine found, applying its own subjective criteria. 207
Normative opinions are not falsifiable, but descriptive opinions
are. Descriptive opinions are false when they are dishonest.208 They
are dishonest when they do not accurately report what the search
engine’s subjective process actually retrieved.
Given how closely guarded the secret of a search engine
algorithm is, outsiders are not in a good position to judge whether
outputs are never, ever, frequently, or rarely dishonest in this

202

Eugene Volokh and Donald M. Falk, GOOGLE First Amendment
Protection for Search Engine Search Results, 8 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y. 883, 891,
898 (2012).
203
Id. at 891.
204
Wu, supra note 107, at 1528.
205
Id.
206
Grimmelmann, supra note 195, at 916.
207
Id. at 917.
208
Id. at 922.
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sense.209 Yet search companies go out of their way to calm public
fears by abandoning courtroom emphasis on the subjectivity of
results in favor of public pronouncements about the honesty of
search. Google, on its “Technology Overview” page of 2004,
specifically assured users that “‘[t]here is no human involvement
or manipulation of results, which is why users have come to trust
Google as a source of objective information . . . .”’210 Google went
on to underscore its commitment “‘to providing thorough and
unbiased search results.’”211 The wording is different today but the
message is the same.212
B. Search Engines as Indexers
There is considerable irony in these statements from Google.
Although it claims in some cases that it is a classic opinion speaker
entitled to heightened First Amendment protection, Google turns to
an alternative and contradictory description of the search business
when the case calls for it. Search engines suddenly stop speaking
and become mere conduits for locating what a user wants. They
function as automated intermediaries bringing together the
questions of users and the answers found on web pages. 213 In
lawsuits seeking to hold Google liable for objectionable content on
indexed sites, continued insistence on search engines having their

209

See, e.g., Bracha and Pasquale, supra note 198, at 1178.
See Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82481, at *3–*4 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006).
211
Id. In light of these remarks, it is jarring to read that Google has never
claimed its search business was neutral. See Volokh and Falk, supra note 202, at
886 (“Google has never waived its rights to choose how to select and arrange its
material.”).
212
“We never manipulate rankings to put our partners higher in our search
results and no one can buy better PageRank. Our users trust our objectivity and
no short-term gain could ever justify breaching that trust.” Ten things we know
to be true, GOOGLE, https://google.com/about/company/philosophy/ (last visited
Aug. 29, 2015).
213
Google’s general counsel invoked this description when he said “We like
to think of ourselves as . . . a card catalogue.” Jeffrey Toobin, Annals of Law:
The Solace of Oblivion, NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 2014, at 26, 29.
210
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own opinions might lead to undesirable results for the company.214
For this reason, Google re-describes the business of search in
purely functional terms, abandoning claims for being a message
giver in favor of being a neutral medium that matches the
questions and answers of others.
Permitting Google to toggle back and forth between First
Amendment rationales is one telling sign of the too much speech
era. The speech interests of users and web publishers are not well
served when Google can set up one First Amendment shield to
protect it against allegations of bias (such as “we are entitled to
express our opinion”) and another to gain immunity for any harm
to reputation or privacy (such as “we express no opinion about the
content of the indexed sites”).215
C. Search Engine Bias
As graduate students, Google founders Sergey Brin and Larry
Page disparaged “advertising funded search engines” as
“inherently . . . biased towards the advertisers and away from the
needs of the consumers.” 216 They pejoratively had in mind the
214

One famous case involved a lawsuit from the former “first lady” of
Germany, Bettina Wulff. When a user started to type in the name “Bettina
Wulff,” the autocomplete function on Google search would suggest links to
allegedly libelous material. Google defended by stressing that these suggestions
are “the algorithmic result of several objective factors, including the popularity
of search terms.” See Grimmelmann, supra note 195, at 872, n.18.
215
Congress granted search engines this sort of immunity in the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1)(2000) (“No
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”). In granting Google’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint
alleging defamation and invasion of privacy, one federal court noted that
through this provision, “‘Congress granted most Internet services immunity
from liability for publishing false or defamatory material so long as the
information was provided by another party.’” Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F.
Supp. 2d 492, 501 (2006) (citation omitted); see also Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2012) (immunizing “information location
tools” from damage claims for copyright infringement).
216
Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 198, at 1166, n.102 (citing to Sergey Brin
& Lawrence Page, Computer Science Department of Stanford University, The
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search engine that would auction off top rankings to the highest
bidder, as if how much a company was willing to pay to be the first
result displayed in response to a query about “asbestos exposure”
was a good way of determining relevance. Such a protocol would
probably elevate plaintiff litigation firms to the top. 217 To avoid
bias, Brin and Page set out to devise a search engine that would
determine the relative utility of websites through a non-advertiser
driven process.218
In the end, Google devised a spectacularly successful search
algorithm that managed to appeal to both users and advertisers.219
As Page put it in 2006, “[t]he economic success we continue to
enjoy is the direct result of our ability to marry our user experience
to the information that advertisers want to communicate.” 220
Although the graphics of how Google displays search results have
changed over time, Google has always distinguished displays that
are purchased by advertisers versus rankings that result from the
automatic workings of the search algorithm. 221
For the non-advertiser results, Google’s key breakthrough was
to tie judgments of a particular website’s usefulness to how often
other highly ranked websites linked to or referred to that website.222
The more highly ranked a website was that linked to a page to be
ranked, the more weight Google gave to its vote of confidence.223
Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine § 8, at 18 (2000),
available at http://infolab.stanford.edu/~backrub/google.html).
217
I owe this example to Lastowka, supra note 185, at 1340.
218
Id. at 1331–32.
219
Id. at 1331.
220
See id. at 1327, (citing Google Q3 2006 Earnings Call Transcript (Oct. 19,
2006),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/18858-google-q3-2006-earnings-calltranscript).
221
See Eric Goldman, Revisiting Search Engine Bias, 38 WILLIAM MITCHELL
L. REV. 96, 102 (2001).
222
For a description of how Google search works, see Lastowka, supra note
185, at 1337–38.
223
Google’s Company Overview page states: “Google search works because
it relies on the millions of individuals posting links on websites to help
determine which other sites offer content of value. We assess the importance of
every web page using more than 200 signals and a variety of techniques,
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In other words, a website could rise through the ranks through a
decentralized process of peer review. The most popular web pages,
as judged by links to them, climb to the top of the pyramid.224
However, a number of factors could bias the apparent
democracy of peer review, including: (1) manual or ad-hoc
manipulation of search rankings to favor Google’s own
subsidiaries, such as YouTube or Google Play;225 (2) structural bias
built into an algorithm purposely designed to favor majority
preferences—a design that frequently will favor well-established
and well-financed sites;226 and (3) ability of wealthier companies to
“game the system” by using search optimization techniques to
inflate their ratings.227 Some commentators respond that any bias in
the search engine business would be self-correcting, since
dissatisfied users would migrate to other search engines. 228 But
Google faces only weak competition in the U.S. and European

including our patented PageRank™ algorithm, which analyzes which sites have
been “voted” to be the best sources of information by other pages across the
web.” Ten things we know to be true, GOOGLE, https://google.com/about/
company/philosophy (last visited July 25, 2015, 3:53 PM).
224
Yochai Benkler defends this pyramidal structure as the result of democracy
and not plutocracy. The success of Google’s search algorithm, Benkler
maintains, is the way it “harnasse[s] the distributed judgments of many users.”
Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112
YALE L. J. 369, 392 (2002).
225
Search King alleged ad hoc bias insofar as Google allegedly intervened
against the automatic workings of its algorithm to demote Search King’s ranking
in retaliation against a competitor. For a complaint that Google unfairly favors
its own android app site over a Portuguese competitor, see Danny Hakim,
Google is Target of European Backlash on U.S. Dominance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
9, 2014, at A1. See also Adam Raff, Search, But You May Not Find, N.Y. TIMES
Op-Ed, Dec. 28, 2009, at A27 (claiming that Google unfairly favors its own
price-comparison sites to Foundem, a British price-comparison web site).
226
Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 198, at 1165, 1184.
227
For a suggestion that high rankings can essentially be bought, see
Lastowka, supra note 185, at 1352–53.
228
Goldman, supra note 221, at 99–100, 102.
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markets229 and competitors face an uphill battle as Google has such
a head start at developing the necessary infrastructure.230
After receiving numerous allegations of search engine bias, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) launched an antitrust
investigation of Google in 2012.231 The major allegation was that
Google used its dominance in the search market to favor its
subsidiaries over competitors. An FTC staff report recommended
filing antitrust charges, finding that Google’s “conduct has
resulted—and will result—in real harm to consumers and to
innovation in the online search and advertising markets.” 232
However, in the end, the FTC issued a “no action” letter, finding
insufficient evidence that Google manipulated searches to stifle
competition. 233 While Google “took aggressive actions to gain
advantage over rival search providers,” the commissioners found
the company did so without breaking any applicable laws.234 Calls
for legal reform went unheeded after Google agreed to alter some
of its practices.235

229

Vindu Goel, Growth for Yahoo, at Last, But Strategy is No Clearer, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2014, at B1. Bing, Microsoft’s search engine, is Google’s only
substantial competitor (Yahoo is in the midst of a contract to use Bing in its
searches) but even after investing $100 million, Bing has not gained much
market share against Google. Id. On the other hand, Eric Goldman points out
that the Facebook platform has emerged as an alternative way to locate material
on the web. Goldman, supra note 221, at 102.
230
Lastowka, supra note 185, at 1334 n. 40.
231
STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REGARDING GOOGLE’S
SEARCH PRACTICES, In re Google, Inc., No. 111-0163 (2013).
232
Brody Mullins, et al., Inside the U.S. Antitrust Probe of Google: Key Staff
Wanted to Sue Internet Giant After Finding “Real Harm to Consumers and
Innovation”, WALL ST. J. (March 19, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/Articles/insidethe-u-s-antitrust-probe-of-google-1426793274.
233
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Google Agrees to Change Its Business
Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns In the Markets for Devices
Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search (Jan. 3, 2013),
http://ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-itsbusiness-practices-resolve-ftc.
234
Id.
235
Mullins, supra note 232.
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In Europe, regulators have long been suspicious of Google’s
market dominance. 236 On April 15, 2015, the European Union’s
competition commissioner filed formal antitrust allegations against
the company, alleging that the company diverts search traffic from
competitors’ shopping sites to Google’s own shopping sites.237
The problem with search is not that we have too much of it.
Rather, this section has argued that Google and other search
engines receive too much First Amendment protection, to the point
where the fairness of search results must be taken on trust. There
may be good reasons for this trust, but it is never safe to permit a
single company to be so dominant in a particular medium of
speech (“search”) that we cannot even examine whether its
channels are fairly open to all. Courts make it difficult even to
examine issues of bias by treating search algorithms as classic
opinion speakers. Even if we were to concede that search results
are subjective, there remains an important difference between
transparent and deceptive search practices that the First
Amendment should not prohibit consumers and competitors from
examining.
V.
SEARCHING FOR REPUTATION
The very idea of searching for someone’s reputation would
once have seemed odd. A person’s reputation used to depend on
what people who actually knew her, or at least who knew other
people who knew her, thought about her. Search engines vastly
enlarged the sources of information about a person, arguably
representing a great victory for “the more speech the better.” At
least the promise was that online reputations would be more
accurate, more information driven, more the product of many
sources and globally accessible to all.238 Critics respond that online
reputations are just as likely to be stale, out-of-date, and based on
236

Kanter & Scott, supra note 7, at B1; see also Hakim, supra note 225, at

A1.

237

Kanter & Scott, supra note 7, at B1.
GORDON BELL & JIM GEMMEL, TOTAL RECALL: HOW THE E-MEMORY
REVOLUTION WILL CHANGE EVERYTHING 56 (2009).
238
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information taken out of context.239 They lament the lack of due
process for anyone who claims harm from stories that search
engines locate, migrate, and perpetuate.240
In 2014, the highest court in Europe entered the too much
speech, too little reputation debate on the side of reputation. 241
Relying on EU privacy directives, 242 Mario Costeja Gonzalez of
Spain sought to have Google remove links to online articles
detailing debts he once had in 1998 that led to the attachment and
public auction of some of his property.243 The stories were true and
based on public records.244 Mr. Gonzalez had retired the debt and
yet, to borrow a term from school days, the black mark remained
part of his permanent record. Drawing on EU statutory law, the
ECJ ruled that persons enjoy a right to have information about
them “forgotten” in circumstances where the harm to reputation

239

See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF
PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8–9 (Vintage Books 2001); MAYER-SCHONBERGER, supra
note 19, at 10–15, 142; JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—
AND HOW TO STOP IT 220, 228–29 (2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1125949.
240
MAYER-SCHONBERGER, supra note 19, at 10–15.
241
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. ___, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&docid=152065.
242
Directive 94/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, art.
12., available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML. The European Parliament has provisionally
approved a new data directive that specifically recognizes a “right of erasure.”
That right in pertinent part provides that “data subjects shall have the right to
obtain from the [data] controller the erasure of personal data relating to them . . .
and to obtain from third parties the erasure of any links to, or copy or replication
of that data, where . . . (a) the data are no longer necessary in relation to the
purposes which they were collected or otherwise processed.” EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, Factsheet on the “Right to be Forgotten Ruling,”
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data_protection/files/factsheets/
factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2015).
243
Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. at ¶14.
244
Id. at ¶16.
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outweighed any public benefit gained from the information.245 The
Spaniard, the court ruled, was entitled to have Google remove links
to the original 1998 article, since he had discharged the debt and
the continual linking to that story no longer served any public
purpose.246
Like most courts, the ECJ drew on the concept of privacy as
the most fully developed legal tool available. However, the court
was aware that the case did not quite fit within privacy. 247 In
referring to a right to have information “forgotten,” the ECJ
struggled to articulate the distinct harm to dignity and reputation.248
The harm occurred not with the original public disclosure of the
Spaniard’s debt troubles but with the persistence of the story over
time. With the rise of search engines, an old story from 1998 in
one Spanish newspaper’s online archive is republished and
transmitted globally to anyone searching under Mario Costeja
Gonzalez’s name.
Unfortunately, the ECJ left the scope of the right to have
information forgotten overly vague. It did not provide guidance as
to when a story becomes old or irrelevant enough to be forgotten.249
245

Id. at ¶91.
Id. at ¶98. Media accounts widely reported that the ECJ decision would
result in the deletion of stories from the Internet but this claim is not accurate.
The ECJ decision granted the Spaniard only the right to have search engines
remove links to online stories when someone searched under his name. The
online stories themselves would not be deleted and could be found by anyone
retrieving them without search engine links. One commentator described the
ECJ decision as doing no more than creating a “speed-bump” to protect
reputation. Persons could still find the 1998 debt story about Mr. Gonzalez in
slower and old-fashioned ways but they would not come across it simply by
typing his name into a box as part of a general background check. Toobin, supra
note 213, at 32 (quoting Viktor Mayer-Schonberger).
247
The ECJ expressly noted that the original online posting of the story in
1998 by a Spanish newspaper was quite lawful since the Spanish Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs had sought as much public notice of the auction as
possible. See Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. at ¶16.
248
See Part VII infra for the connection between dignity and reputation.
249
Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. at ¶93 (right to have personal information
removed when it is “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in
relation to those purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed”).
246
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The court did not even defend its specific conclusion that the 1998
story about the Spaniard’s debts was for some reason within the
right to forget. As law and economics scholar Judge Richard
Posner noted in another context, complaints of the Spaniard’s sort
might amount to nothing more than a self-interested attempt to
misrepresent oneself in public, to the disadvantage of others. 250
Professor Richard Epstein takes a similar position, arguing that
“when a major change in personal or financial status is
contemplated by another party, the white lies that make human
interaction possible turn into frauds of a somewhat deeper dye.”251
In sum, the ECJ decision left unanswered the question of
whether its decision would lead to a dumbed-down web, carrying
only purged versions of past personal histories. The court did not
address the potentially crippling burden placed on data providers to
monitor what should be deleted, when it should be deleted, and
from where it should be deleted.252 From Google’s perspective, the
ECJ’s ruling threatened the very survival of a borderless Internet.253
If and when other regions of the world follow Europe in imposing
their own local rules on what needs to be forgotten, then search
companies would be under multiple and conflicting obligations.254
For all its flaws, a right to have search engines forget about
past stories does have appeal as a way to restore to individuals the
power to shape and reshape their reputations. In the U.S., public
opinion polls suggest a broad consensus that individuals should be

250

RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 46, 660–63 (Richard. A.
Epstein et al. eds., Aspen Law & Business, 5th ed. 1998).
251
Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old
Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1994).
252
In one instance, Google complied with a person’s request to remove links
to certain material that had once appeared in media outlets for The Guardian and
BBC. These organizations complained and Google reinstated some of the links.
See Mark Scott, Google Touring Europe on “Right to be Forgotten”, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2014, at B3.
253
Farhad Manjoo, “Right to be Forgotten” Could Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
6, 2015, at B1.
254
See, e.g., Toobin, supra note 213, at 32.
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able to delete or erase some private information. 255 In Europe,
during the five months immediately following the ECJ decision,
Google received approximately 143,000 requests from individuals
asking the company to take down links to allegedly stale
information. 256 Google granted about half of those. 257 Fear of
penalties might motivate Google to err on the side of granting
requests. But it could be that even Google is finding the equities to
255

92% of American adults surveyed by the Annenberg School of
Communications favored regulations requiring marketers and advertisers to
delete personal information upon request, with nearly two-thirds favoring a
policy that would require immediate deletion after the transaction for which the
data had been given is completed. Joseph Turow, et. al, Americans Reject
Targeted Advertising and 3 Activities that Enable It (Annenberg School for
Commc’n 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478214. In 2015, the
Annenberg School conducted a follow-up survey, finding that 84% of
respondents agreed with the statement, “I want to have control over what
marketers can learn about me online.” Natasha Singer, Sharing Data, But Not
Happily: Americans Are Uneasy About All That Tracking, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
2015, at B1.
256
Mark Scott, Facebook Leads in Links Erased by Google in E.U., N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2014 at B3 [hereinafter Scott, Links Erased]; see also Noam
Cohen & Mark Scott, Times Articles Removed from Google Results in Europe,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2014, at A3. To handle requests, Google and Microsoft have
developed online request forms. Mark Scott, Microsoft Taking Steps to Comply
with the Right to be Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2014, 11:06 AM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/microsoft-to-wade-into-complyingwith-the-right-to-be-forgotten/?src=xps [hereinafter Scott, Microsoft Taking
Steps].
257
Scott, Links Erased, supra note 256, at B3. Examples of requests granted
are those from a rape victim and from a defendant exonerated in a child
pornography case. See id. (rape story); Toobin, supra note 213, at 31 (child
pornography). Google has also removed links to three New York Times articles:
two wedding announcements, one death notice, and a report about a settled case
from 2002. Cohen & Scott, supra note 256, at A3. Among requests that Google
has denied are requests from a public official to remove links to news articles
about child pornography accusations against him. See Toobin, supra note 213, at
31. Google has also denied requests from a person requesting delinking to a
2013 story reporting his acquittal in a criminal case, on the grounds that the
story was still too recent to be irrelevant, see id., as well as a request from a
Swiss financial services professional seeking the taking down of links to ten web
pages outlining his conviction for financial crimes. Scott, Links Erased, supra
note 256, at B3.
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favor less information about individuals, not more, which would
indicate a rare instance of a retreat from the more speech, the better
approach by which the Internet lives.
Two stories illustrate why some reform along the lines of a
right to be forgotten is necessary. The first story is a slight and silly
episode, the second horrible and heartbreaking.
In his book, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital
Age, Viktor Mayer-Schonberger opens with the following story.258
A college student enrolled in a teacher certification program posted
to a social networking site a photograph of her in a pirate hat
holding a glass above the caption, “Drunken Pirate.” 259 Even
though she successfully completed all coursework, her university
refused to grant her a teacher certificate after being notified by a
supervisor who had seen the photograph and considered it
unprofessional behavior. 260 The student wanted the photograph
forgotten, but her attempt to delete the photo was idle.261 The social
networking site did permit her to delete the photograph on her own
page but by then it lived other lives on other sites not controlled by
the former student. 262 In Internet language, the information had
washed downstream.
It could be argued that the student consented to making the
photograph public by posting it in the first place, that she knew or
should have known how the Internet works.263 To be sure, this case
258

MAYER-SCHONBERGER, supra note 19, at 1–2.
Id.
260
Writer Jeffrey Toobin speculates that checking a job applicant’s Facebook
page is probably part of due diligence today. Outloud, NEW YORKER podcast
(Sept. 2014) (available using iTunes).
261
MAYER-SCHONBERGER, supra note 19, at 4.
262
Id.
263
Many argue that the burden should be on individual users to practice more
“digital abstinence” about what they post online. Google’s CEO, Eric Schmidt,
suggested that people have to become “much more careful how they talk, how
they interact, what they offer of themselves.” Id. at 109. It is ironic to find a
leading advocate of the more speech, the better approach suggest that
individuals speak a bit less. Perhaps that is why, in another statement, Schmidt
noted that self-censorship or strategies like using a pseudonym are likely to
carry costs, since in the future the price of hiding information “might be
259
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goes beyond what the concept of privacy can illumine, since the
student publicly shared the photograph. The deeper issue is akin to
the problem about forgetting that the ECJ grappled with in the case
of the Spaniard’s retired debt. At what point do the “drunken
pirate” moments get forgotten and forgiven? Who has the power to
decide when the photograph’s online presence should expire and
on what grounds of relevance, age, or other criteria?
These are questions that cannot sensibly be asked within the
more speech, the better paradigm. The very notion that true
information “expires” seems to be a contradiction in terms, as if
data are like clothes that go out of style or truth is of limited
duration. But Mayer-Schonberger, a leading critic of our too much
speech world, sets out to defend the counterintuitive notion that too
much remembering and too little forgetting is harmful to the
human learning condition.264 Out of time or context,265 information
bytes form online reputations controlled by anonymous “click
voting” for the story that appeals to many who might never have
met the person in the flesh. These artificial reputations stick to a
person, thanks to the permanence of digital memory. For every
web page that disappears, a copy of the original material springs up
elsewhere.266 Online stories from the past remain front and center,
regardless of the trajectory of a person’s real life past the time
when the information was originally stored.267

irrelevance” on the only platforms that will matter. ERIC SCHMIDT AND JARED
COHEN, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: TRANSFORMING NATIONS, BUSINESSES AND
OUR LIVES 33 (2013).
264
MAYER-SCHONBERGER, supra note 19, at 92–128.
265
“In most cases, a high position on popular search engines . . . adds
legitimacy and reliability to a statement or source. A statement, which in its
original context, would not be relied upon as fact may be relied upon as fact if
reproduced and displayed prominently in a particular search query.” Durkee,
supra note 32, at 804–05, n.172.
266
Ambrose, supra note 18, at 372.
267
“When intimate personal information circulates among a small group of
people who know us well, its significance can be weighed against other aspects
of our personality and character. By contrast, when intimate information is
removed from its original context and revealed to strangers, we are vulnerable to
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Where the first story seems almost a parody of those who think
there can be no such thing as too much speech, the second story is
somber. In the second story, the harm caused to a grieving family
was neither to reputation nor to privacy since the photographs they
wanted removed from the Internet were never theirs. The harm was
to the basic respect and dignity a family is owed after the death of
their daughter.268
In 2006, an eighteen-year old woman was decapitated in a car
accident. 269 Employees of the California Highway Patrol
improperly emailed crime scene photographs to friends and the
pictures of the decapitated woman began circulating on the
Internet, eventually turning up on numerous websites, replicating
like a malignant virus. 270 Here was a situation where the
information had no public value; those leaking it said they did so
only for the photo’s “shock value.”271 Distraught and worried that
their three surviving children might see the pictures, the parents
forbade them to go online and began, to no avail, to seek to have
Google and other search engines remove links to the photos.272 But
there was nothing akin to the European right to forget available to
them.273
From the moral point of view, there was no information benefit
to the photographs’ presences online that could possibly justify the
harm to the family. Yet the family was legally powerless to
demand the removal of the photographs.274 Individual websites or
platforms, at their discretion, could remove the material. But when
the items went viral, this was no solution. A search for the
photographs might return a message that a website containing the
being misjudged on the basis of our most embarrassing, and therefore most
memorable, tastes and preferences.” ROSEN, supra note 239, at 8.
268
For an account of this story, see Toobin, supra note 213, at 26–32.
269
Id. at 26.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id.
273
Id. at 32.
274
The family did win a civil damage suit against the California Highway
Patrol for the leak of the photos to the media. Id.
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photographs no longer existed, but the search engine would move
on to link to the next of the sites to which the photographs had
migrated.275
A case such as this shows why the ECJ decision, for all its
problems, is groundbreaking. Against Google’s protests, the ECJ
rightly ruled that search engines effectively control the availability
of material online276 and hence should not be able to disown all
responsibility for the links they give out.277
VI.
TOO MUCH SPEECH, TOO MUCH SURVEILLANCE
Government surveillance would seem to be a counter-example
to my thesis that we live in a world of too much speech. After all,
one would think that surveillance would chill people from
speaking or being spoken to in the first place. But too much speech
and too much surveillance strangely go together. This unexpected
convergence may be the greatest threat to free speech that we face.
Few persons reject the legitimacy of some amount of
government surveillance in an age of global terrorism. 278 The
sticking point is whether surveillance policies will be decided
democratically, with as much public disclosure and public debate
as security concerns permit, 279 or will fear of terrorism pervert

275

Id. at 26. For the short life of some web pages, see Ambrose, supra note
18, at 372.
276
See Blackman, supra note 197, at 30 (noting sites not indexed by a search
engine might as well not exist).
277
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, v. Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos (AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. ___, ¶28, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&docid=152065.
278
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 39 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[E]veryone,
including this Court, agrees [the prevention of terrorist attacks] is ‘of the highest
order of magnitude.’”).
279
Compare David Frum, We Need More Secrecy: Why Government
Transparency Can Be an Enemy of Liberty, THE ATLANTIC (May 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/05/we-need-moresecrecy/359820/, with Nancy L. Rosenblum, Governing Beyond Imagination:
The “World Historical” Sources of Democratic Dysfunction, 94 B.U. L. REV.
649, 657–60 (2014).
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democracy into an odd justification for subjecting everyone to a
secret policy of all search all the time?
A. The Democratization of Surveillance
While open information comes in with the democratic tide,
even democracies feel the pull of authoritarian information policies
in an age of terrorism. The very digital technologies that
underwrite the expansion of speech also provide government with
more capacity for surveillance of speech. 280 In the era of
investigative journalism that began roughly with Watergate, there
was little the government could do to use the facilities of the New
York Times or the Washington Post to monitor leaks of classified
information to these newspapers. 281 What has changed is that the
NSA is in a position to use, and does use, “the new press”—the
advances in the infrastructure of communication provided by the
internet service providers and platforms—to gather up, store and
analyze what is being said through these facilities. 282 The
government does this through a combination of methods,
sometimes involving voluntary compliance from the tech giants283
280

See Neil M. Richards, Symposium, Privacy and Technology: The Dangers
of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1936 (2013) (“The same digital
technologies that have revolutionized our daily lives . . . have also created ever
more detailed records about those lives.”).
281
I owe this observation to Balkin, supra note 31, at 2297–98.
282
See Richards, supra note 280, at 1936.
283
See infra notes 285 and 323 and accompanying text for controversy over
how much voluntary compliance there has been. In 2010, WikiLeaks released
video footage of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. It followed this by
releasing to news organizations a sample of classified State Department cables.
In response, the U.S. government mounted a campaign to enlist the help of
electronics communications companies in shutting the site down. It succeeded in
getting the registration company that directs users to the domain name,
“wikileaks.org,” to cease service, so that users who searched for the site came up
with nothing. Amazon ceased hosting WikiLeaks on its cloud computing
service, Apple removed an iPhone app that provided access to information
WikiLeaks had posted online. PayPal and other payment services ceased
providing service for WikiLeaks. See Benkler, supra note 8, at 340–44 (noting
that none of these companies were legally compelled to act against WikiLeaks,
though considerable pressure was brought on them to do so). On the other hand,
Google and Twitter did not fully cooperate with the efforts to shut down
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while other times compelling disclosure, 284 though this is not
without resistance.285
As Neil Richards puts it, the novelty of contemporary
surveillance is that corporate monitoring and government
surveillance have become “related parts of the same problem.”286 If
it were not for the trove of personal data about consumers,
government would not be in a position to monitor our political
activities quite as well. 287 Or as Balkin suggests, the
“democratization of information” includes the democratization of
surveillance, as routine, daily data collection on virtually all of us
becomes a standard method of tracing patterns that may uncover a
plot or crime by someone else.288
One example of the convergence of government surveillance
and corporate gathering of personal data was the program at issue
in the 2006 case, Gonzales v. Google.289 To buttress its defense of
WikiLeaks. See Yochai Benkler, WikiLeaks and the Protect-IP Act: A New
Public-Private Threat to the Internet Commons, 140 DAEDALUS 154, 158
(2011).
284
In 2013, the Justice Department secretly subpoenaed two months of phone
records of various Associated Press reporters to investigate an AP story
revealing classified information on a foiled Al Qaeda plot. See Sari Horwitz,
Under Sweeping Subpoenas, Justice Department Obtained AP Phone Records in
Leak Investigation, WASH. POST (May 13, 2013), http://washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/under-sweeping-subpoenas-justice-department-obtainedap-phone-records-in-leak-investigation/2013/05/13/11d1bb82-bc11-11e2-89c93be8095fe767_story.html.
285
Recently released documents from a 2008 federal court case show the
extent of Yahoo’s resistance to complying with government subpoenas for
customer information. See Vindu Goel & Charlie Savage, Threat of Daily Fine
Shows Government’s Aggressive Push for Data, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2014 at
B1.
286
Richards, supra note 280, at 1935.
287
In recognition of this problem, Apple announced in 2014 that its iOS8
operating system on the latest generation of iPhones “was designed so that it’s
not technically feasible for us to respond to government warrants for the
extraction of . . . data from devices . . . running iOS 8.” Privacy-Government
Requests,
APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/privacy/government-informationrequests/ (last visited Aug., 25, 2015).
288
Balkin, supra note 31, at 2297.
289
234 F.R.D. 674 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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the constitutionality of the Child Online Protection Act of 1998,290
the government subpoenaed evidence from search companies
about the availability of indecent material on the Internet. It first
sought “all” URLs indexed by the search engines, then a sample of
a million, and finally settled on 50,000. It also sought the texts of
all search queries entered during a two-month period, eventually
narrowing the request down to 5,000 queries.291 Google objected
and eventually persuaded a federal court judge to block the request
for texts of search queries and to scale back considerably the
number of URL addresses to be turned over.292 Still, in the end the
government gained use of Google’s information infrastructure in
ways that government could never have used the facilities of the
New York Times.
1. The NSA and Snowden Files: Telephone Monitoring
In 2013, definitive evidence of the NSA’s secret phone data
gathering operation came to light through former agency contractor
Edward Snowden’s leaks to the British newspaper, The
Guardian. 293 The NSA operation centered on the collection and
storage of virtually all telephone numbers dialed from or to a
United States phone customer, for possible analysis to links to
phone numbers linked to known or suspected terrorists. 294 The
program did not involve the NSA listening in to any
conversations.295
290

47 U.S.C. § 231 (2012).
Gonzales, 234 F.R.D. at 678–79.
292
Id. at 688.
293
See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of
Verizon
Customers
Daily,
GUARDIAN,
June
5,
2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizoncourt-order.
294
Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14–19 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated,
Obama v. Klayman, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 15189 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
295
Id. On June 1, 2015, the NSA telephone metadata program came to a
temporary halt when Congress failed to extend statutory authority for it. Carl
Hulse, Bluff Called, McConnell Misplays His Hand in Phone Data Fight, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2015, at A13. The next day, Congress approved a modified
surveillance program where phone data would remain in the possession of the
phone companies, but available to the NSA upon obtaining warrants from the
291
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To date, four federal courts have ruled on the legality of the
program. In Klayman v. Obama, Judge Richard Leon of the
District of Columbia Circuit found the NSA’s collection of bulk
telephone data to be an unconstitutional infringement on Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches.296 However, in
ACLU v. Clapper, Judge William Pauley III of the Second Circuit
upheld the constitutionality of the program, finding that phone
users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers
they dial.297
On appeal, both the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
these respective district court decisions.298 However, neither court
reached the constitutional issues of speech and privacy that are the
concern of this Article.299 The Second Circuit ruled only that the
NSA lacked statutory authority to engage in bulk collection of
phone records. 300 The court left open the issue of whether clear
Congressional authorization of such a program would be
constitutional. 301 In the D.C. Circuit, a three-judge panel vacated
Judge Leon’s decision in Klayman but remanded the case to the
trial court for further proceedings that would give the plaintiffs an
opportunity to uncover evidence during discovery that their own
phone records were among those turned over to the NSA.302
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. See Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268,
269–77 (2015) (to be codified at 50 U. S. C. § 1861); see also Michael D. Shear,
In Pushing for Revised Surveillance Program, Obama Strikes His Own Balance,
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2015, at A14.
296
Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 7, 30–32.
297
ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated,
785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
298
ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 820–22; Obama v. Klayman, 2015 U.S.
App. Lexis 15189, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 28, 2015).
299
ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 821, n.12; Obama v. Klayman, 2015 U.S.
App. Lexis 15189 at *1–*4, 11, 22.
300
ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 821.
301
Id. at 824–25.
302
Obama v. Klayman, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 15189. One judge found that the
plaintiffs had shown a probability that their own phone records were among
those collected by the NSA but had not shown a substantial likelihood of
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Since neither court of appeals reached the constitutional issues
addressed in this Article,303 District Judge Leon’s vacated decision
is still worthy of serious analysis. Of particular note, this section
will argue, is Judge Leon’s argument that Fourth Amendment law
on privacy must evolve to keep up with the evolution of
surveillance technology in this era of too much speech.
Judge Leon began by comparing the government’s “old” style,
occasional surveillance of specific phone conversations to the
NSA’s post 9/11 secret program for automatically collecting bulk
data on the phone calls of millions of Americans.304 In the 1979
case, Smith v. Maryland,305 the Supreme Court ruled that the police
did not need a warrant to install a pen register306 on the phone of a
particular criminal suspect, since no one has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.307 Telephone users
voluntarily transmit this information to telephone companies,
knowing that they become part of the telephone companies’
business records.308 In defending the NSA bulk data collection, the
government cited this case as the controlling precedent. 309
However, the judge disagreed.310 In Smith, the phone monitoring
ultimately prevailing on the merits. Id. at 6 (Brown, J.). He voted to remand the
case to the trial court, where further discovery might uncover evidence that their
phone records were among those collected by the NSA. Id. at 10–11. A second
judge found the plaintiffs had not even established standing to sue. Nevertheless,
he joined in the decision to remand in order to give the plaintiffs an opportunity
to establish standing. Id. at 23–24 (Williams, J.).
303
Although the Second Circuit decided Clapper solely on statutory grounds,
it did offer remarks on the constitutional issues for the guidance of the trial court
upon remand. The court described the constitutional concerns as “vexing,”
“serious,” and “daunting.” ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d at 821, 824–25.
304
Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 7, 30–32.
305
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
306
A pen register is a small device that records phone numbers dialed.
307
Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. Subsequent to Smith, Congress enacted the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3121, requiring judicial
approval of the installation of pen registers.
308
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–44.
309
Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 31.
310
Id. at 30–32. In ACLU v. Clapper, 957 F. Supp. 2d. 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y.
2013), the district judge reached the opposite conclusion, finding that Smith was
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was of a particular person suspected of making threatening calls. In
the NSA program, the agency routinely collected phone logs of
millions of Americans suspected of nothing, in the hopes of mining
the bulk data for leads to suspicious activity. 311 In Smith, the
surveillance lasted only a matter of days and data was not retained.
In the NSA case, the bulk collection of data was ongoing and the
agency showed every intention of maintaining its growing database
“for as long as America is combatting terrorism.”312
Finally, and most importantly for the judge, the relation
between phone companies and government had dramatically
changed from 1979 to 2013. In 1979, there was no formalized
agreement between the two to conduct phone surveillance; rather,
in 1979 there was only phone company cooperation with a criminal
investigation targeted at a particular individual. 313 But, the judge
continued, today’s citizens certainly did not expect what the
Snowden files revealed, that the government and phone companies
were operating “what is effectively a joint intelligence-gathering
operation.”314

still controlling and that persons had no privacy interest in dialed numbers in the
possession of a third party (the phone company). In vacating the district court
decision on other grounds, the Second Circuit described the Supreme Court’s
privacy jurisprudence since Smith as “in some turmoil” and expressed sympathy
for the argument that the movement of mass amounts of personal data onto
mobile phones casts doubt on the continuing applicability of Smith to modern
technologies. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821–822 (2d Cir. 2015). One
commentator predicts that “[t]he third party doctrine will be dismantled soon,
and for good reason,” noting that “the sweeping collection programs brought to
light by Snowden’s leaks have reinvigorated the push to abandon it.” Jane
Bambauer, Data, Police, and the Whole Constitution 4 (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
311
The government defended its bulk collection of call logs by citing their use
in foiling three imminent terrorist attacks. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 40–41.
But the judge concluded that none of the episodes involved the kind of urgency
that might justify warrantless surveillance. Id. The district judge in Clapper
reached the opposite conclusion. ACLU v. Clapper, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 755–56.
312
Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 32.
313
Id. at 32–33.
314
Id. at 33.
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The judge drew this controversial, and probably overstated,
conclusion from the government’s own description of the NSA
bulk phone data program as one where “certain
telecommunications service providers . . . produce to the NSA on a
daily basis electronic copies of call detail records, or telephony
metadata.” 315 The existence of such a formalized policy was a
major factor in the judge’s finding that “the relationship between
the NSA and telecom companies [had] become so thoroughly
unlike those considered by the Supreme Court” in 1979 as to make
the Smith precedent inapplicable.316
In issuing, but staying, a preliminary injunction against the
NSA telephony collection, the judge cited the changes in
Americans’ telephone habits that made telephone records of such
interest to the NSA. Here the problem of too much speech came to
the fore. Mobile devices, principally smartphones, have morphed
into ubiquitous, multi-purpose tools. Telephone “[r]ecords that
once would have revealed a few scattered tiles of information
about a person now reveal an entire mosaic—a vibrant and
constantly updating picture of the person’s life.”317
2. The NSA and Snowden Files: Electronic Monitoring
In addition to revealing the NSA collection of phone logs,
Snowden leaked information about a “Special Sources Operation”
315

Id. at 32 (emphasis added by the trial judge).
Id. at 31. The judge characterized the cooperation between government and
telecom companies as amounting to a joint enterprise since the companies were
turning over bulk data on a routine, daily basis. However, this does not mean
that the companies were cooperating voluntarily or that government somehow
had a technological back door into company servers, as has sometimes been
reported. For the back door rumors, see infra Part VI.A.2.
317
Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (citation omitted). In a prior case, the
Supreme Court similarly emphasized that Fourth Amendment law has to change
with the technology. In holding that the police need a warrant before searching a
suspect’s cellphone, Justice Roberts emphasized how much more personal
information a person carries on a smartphone than persons could have carried on
their person before. Failure to see how the smartphone has revolutionized
communications would be analogous, Justice Roberts quipped, to a failure to see
the difference between riding on horseback and flying to the moon. Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014).
316
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where the NSA developed strategic partnerships with corporate
conduits of electronic communications.318 Code-named “PRISM,”
Snowden considered the operation to be “the biggest single
contributor to [NSA] intelligence reports.”319
Exactly how PRISM worked remains a matter of dispute. 320
One leaked NSA slide illustrated the agency collecting information
“directly from the servers” of Internet giants, including Yahoo,
Google, Facebook, Apple, and others. 321 But each of these
companies has fiercely denied any knowledge of PRISM. 322 The
Snowden files implied that NSA might have created or been given
a “back door” into the servers of Internet giants, but recently
released court documents cast doubt on that claim and support the
companies’ contention that they resisted cooperating with the
NSA.323
Even without a back door into the servers of tech companies,
the U.S. government is adept at invisible forms of speech
regulation that do not disturb the face of things. A prime example
318

Ewen Macaskill & Gabriel Dance, The NSA Files Decoded: What the
Revelations Mean to You, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-filessurveillance-revelations-decoded#section/1; see also Glenn Greenwald, NSA
Prism Program Taps into User Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/ustech-giants-nsa-data.
319
Greenwald, supra note 318.
320
See Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything We Know about Prism to Date,
WASH. POST (June 12, 2013), http://washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2013/06/12/heres-everything-we-know-about-prism-to-date/.
321
Greenwald, supra note 318.
322
Lee, supra note 320.
323
For Yahoo’s resistance, see Goel and Savage, supra note 285, at B1. See
also Charlie Savage, Redactions in U.S. Memo Leave Doubts on Data Plan,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2014, at A16. Apple’s website flatly states: “Apple has
never worked with any government agency from any country to create a ‘back
door’ in any of our products or services.” Privacy-Government Requests, APPLE,
http://apple.com/privacy/government-information-requests. For Microsoft’s
statement that it complied only with “lawful demands” of the government, see
Nicole Perlroth, et al., N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, at A1.
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is the issuance of “national security letters” to electronic
communications providers. 324 The USA Patriot Act, 325 passed in
response to 9/11 and reauthorized by Congress in 2006, authorized
the director of the FBI and other officials to issue a national
security letter (“NSL”) to subpoena certain information about a
named subscriber’s electronic communications.326 The provider is
under a legal duty to comply with the NSL and also to say nothing
about even receiving an NSL, let alone disclosing its contents.327
So, underneath the free flow of information, the very companies
running the infrastructure are under the modern equivalent of gag
orders or prior restraints typical of the too little speech era.
All of this takes place out of public sight and, for most of the
last decade, with little judicial review. 328 The little information
made public by the government shows that the FBI issued 192,500
NSL letters between 2003 and 2006.329 Reviewing NSLs issued in
2006, the Department of Justice found over 640 legal violations.330
In response to the straightjacket which receipt of NSLs puts
them in, eight large tech companies formed a coalition in 2013
known as “Reform Government Surveillance.” The coalition
324

18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012).
50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012). For amendments to the U.S.A. Patriot Act
subsequent to the Klayman decision, see Shear, supra note 295.
326
18 U.S.C. § 2709(a)–(b) (2012). The law did not authorize disclosure of
the content of any communications.
327
18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (2012) (“No wire or electronic communication service
provider . . . shall disclose to any person that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
has sought or obtained access to information or records.”).
328
But see Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F. 3d 861, 883 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding in part
that the nondisclosure requirement is unconstitutional in the absence of the
government initiating judicial review of the need for such a requirement).
329
Ellen Nakashima, Plaintiff Who Challenged FBI’s National Security
Letters
Reveals
Concerns,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
10,
2010),
http://washingtonpost.com/wp=dyn/content/article/2010/08/10. In response to
customer concerns, Apple announced on September 18, 2014 that it has received
fewer than 250 government national security requests as of that date in 2014.
See Privacy-Government Requests, supra note 287.
330
U.S DEPT. OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF NATIONAL
SECURITY LETTERS: ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND EXAMINATION
OF NSL USAGE IN 2006, 81 (2008).
325
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reached a settlement with the Justice Department that permitted
member companies to disclose to the public broad information
about how many NSLs they have received per 1,000 users. 331
However, coalition members are still prohibited from disclosing
anything to the person(s) being monitored.332 Twitter did not join
with other companies in settling with the Justice Department but
instead filed a pending lawsuit, alleging that it had a First
Amendment right to speak publicly to its members about
government requests for personal data.333 This case promises to be
a throwback to the too little speech era.
3. A Post-Snowden Era?
Can technology fix what technology wrought? Less than two
years after Snowden leaked NSA files, Apple introduced a new
iPhone and operating system that encrypted a user’s passwords in
ways that not even Apple can unlock. In its revised privacy policy,
the company explicitly stated that it no longer had the technical
capacity to cooperate with government requests for user data from
the latest iPhones. 334 The New York Times carried word of this
development on page one under the headline, “Signaling a PostSnowden era, iPhone Locks Out the N.S.A.” 335 The Android
operating system is adopting similar strategies.336
Changes such as these show a genuine pushback against the too
much speech/too much surveillance problem. Internet companies
are aware that cooperation with surveillance could cost them
331

Mark Isaac, Twitter Sues U.S. to Expand Public Disclosure of Data
Requests, N.Y. TIMES, October 8, 2014, at B2.
332
See id.
333
Id.
334
“Unlike our competitors, Apple cannot bypass your passcode, and
therefore cannot access this data.” See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
335
David Sanger & Brian X. Chen, Signaling a Post-Snowden Era, iPhone
Locks out N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2014, at A1. In an opinion piece
published in the New York Times, Snowden agreed that technological changes
since his original leaks have made a “profound” and positive difference in
protecting privacy. Edward J. Snowden, The World Says No to Surveillance,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2015, at A23.
336
Sanger & Chen, supra note 335, at A3.
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customers at home and abroad. To solidify trust, the companies
have joined with human rights groups to form the Global Network
Initiative (“GNI”). The basic principles of the GNI include the
statement that “participating companies will respect and protect the
privacy rights of users when confronted with government
demands, laws or regulations that compromise privacy in a manner
inconsistent with internationally recognized laws and standards.”337
But whether there are such “internationally recognized” standards
is far from clear, at least to James Comey, director of the FBI.338
Comey criticized the encryption of the iPhone 6 as turning the
phone into a device that Apple markets “expressly to allow people
to hold themselves beyond the law.”339
The one thing that seems certain is that the NSA will respond
to the latest technological impediments to data gathering with
breakthroughs of its own. For instance, the New York Times
reported (against a request from intelligence agencies not to
publish the information) that the NSA has succeeded in using its
code-breaking skills to decipher encrypted information. 340 Secret
programs of de-encryption are the equivalent of a stealth back door
into reading secure information.
VII. FROM DIAGNOSIS TO PRESCRIPTION
Under the heading of too much speech, this Article groups
together a number of otherwise discrete problems affecting the
quality of discourse. These problems range from the private control
one company has over the speech we call “search” to the public
control governments have to subject speech to universal
337

Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy, GLOBAL NETWORK
INITIATIVE, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org//principles/index.php (last visited
Aug. 29, 2015).
338
Sanger & Chen, supra note 335, at A3.
339
Id. Comey compared the locked nature of the iPhone 6 to the marketing of
“a closet that could never be opened–even if it involves a case involving a child
kidnapping and a court order.” Id.
340
Perlroth, supra note 323, at A1. In urging the Times not to publish this
story, the government argued that the NSA would lose the advantage if targets
knew their encrypted information could be read. Id. at A3.
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surveillance, to the Big Data collection on all of us. Each of these
separate topics shares a common concern for the growing
imbalance between the values of free speech and the competing
values of privacy and reputation. This concern is not new, but the
age of too much speech brings with it an ideology that decisively
shifts power over personal data from individuals to corporate
actors. That power shift is then justified by questionable uses of the
First Amendment.
What can be done? By giving us access and links to an
abundance of information, Google has earned the right to become a
verb standing for the combined ways Internet services create and
disseminate new knowledge.341 But we can and should do better at
bringing privacy and reputation along with us into the information
age. This section suggests general reforms that would call speech
back from its own excesses.
A. Limiting the Reach of Commercial Speech Doctrine
In 1976, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that
the advertising of prescription drug prices, even though an
invitation to engage in a commercial transaction, nonetheless
implicates First Amendment rights to valuable information.342 As
mentioned previously, the Court did not hinge its decision on the
speaking rights of pharmacists to advertise prescription drug
prices.343 In a case brought by a consumer council representing the
interests of persons dependent on prescription drugs, the Court
stressed the rights of the consumer audience to receive price
information via advertising.344 Quoting from a lower court opinion,
the Court stressed that the audience had an interest in health that
was “‘fundamentally deeper than a trade consideration.’”345 Here
was a case where advertising clearly served important public
341

See, e.g., James B. Stewart, Alphabet with a Capital G., N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
14, 2015, at B1.
342
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770–71 (1976).
343
See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
344
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 755.
345
Id. at 755 (quoting trial court decision below).
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purposes. Presumably, a case about advertising the price of beef
jerky would have fit less easily within the norms of the First
Amendment.346 As the Court put it, “not all commercial messages
contain . . . a public interest message.”347 Nor did the decision rest
on some putative contribution advertising makes to the workings
of the free market. Even while recognizing that commercial speech
was sometimes entitled to First Amendment protection, the
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy court emphasized that advertising
as an economic activity could be subject to legal regulation when
the ads proposed unlawful services, or were false or misleading.348
Compare the limited reach of commercial speech protection in
1976 with the blanket protection the First Amendment gave to
commercial speech in the 2011 case, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.349
In Sorrell, the Court struck down a Vermont economic regulation
that, among other things, restricted sales representatives of
pharmaceutical companies from gaining access to prescriberidentifying prescription records kept by pharmacies. These
salespersons wanted the information to customize their sales
pitches to the identified physicians. In striking down the Vermont
law, the Sorrell court came perilously close to announcing the
death of privacy, since the First Amendment now gave drug
salespersons access to what we normally consider confidential
data—data communicated by physicians only to pharmacists or
health plans in relation to treating patients.
In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, recognition of commercial
speech arguably fit prevailing norms about the right of consumers
to make informed decisions about how best to afford prescription
drugs. In Sorrell, the larger use of commercial speech doctrine
flouts the state’s interest in regulating pharmacies and in keeping

346

In upholding a state regulation of prescription drug marketing, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals found no First Amendment issue, analogizing the
regulation to one of beef jerky. See IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52
(1st Cir. 2008).
347
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762.
348
Id. at 770–72.
349
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
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prescriber-identifying prescription information confidential.350 The
Sorrell court does tout the potential health benefits of permitting
pharmaceutical representatives to perfect their sales pitches to
physicians.351 But Vermont chose a regulatory scheme that rested
on an alternative, reasonable view of the prescription drug market.
Vermont took the position that keeping prescription drugs as
affordable as possible was in the health interests of the state’s
population. The marketing practices of retailers, geared to selling
high price brand name drugs, harmed these health interests, in the
judgment of the state.352 Nothing in the commercial speech doctrine
should have prohibited Vermont from regulating the prescription
drug business along these lines. But we get too much speech in
Sorrell when what once was considered economic conduct
(marketing) subject to reasonable state regulation becomes free
speech protected from government interference.
B. Privacy and Public Discourse
In 1988 the Washington City Paper published a list of Judge
Robert Bork’s video rentals in an attempt to derail the Senate’s
confirmation of the judge’s nomination to the Supreme Court.353 To
prevent a recurrence of such surveillance, Congress passed the
Video Privacy Protection Act.354 Critics objected to the law as an
unconstitutional infringement on the free speech rights of video
storeowners to speak to others who wanted to speak in turn about
Judge Bork.355 However, snooping on Judge Bork’s video rentals
350

Id. at 2677–79 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for dismissing
Vermont’s considerable interests in regulating pharmacies).
351
Id. at 2671.
352
Id. at 2670; see also IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 54 (1st Cir.
2008).
353
For the reporter’s account of his investigation of Judge Bork’s video
rentals,
see
Michael
Dolan,
The
Bork
Tapes
Saga,
http://www.theamericanporch.com/bork4.html. The reporter claimed his point in
publishing the story was to show the importance of a constitutional right to
privacy, a right that Judge Bork opposed in his judicial opinions. Id.
354
18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2002).
355
Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene Volokh’s
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559, 1562–64 (2000).
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netted the Washington City Paper only a mundane list of movie
titles whose informational benefits to the Senate confirmation
hearings were far outweighed by the intrusions into privacy.356 As
important as public discourse is, there should be space for private
nondisclosure, as recognized in tort law. 357 In a world where
everything we communicate in private, even by renting a video, is
fair game for public discourse, individuals are likely to adopt
coping strategies such as self-censorship or even withdrawal from
participation in public life.
Not everyone will agree that political debate is demeaned by
the media’s search for leaks about a candidate’s video rental
habits. Dirty tricks have a long and storied history in American
politics, as elsewhere, and we should hardly expect or want to
cleanse politics of sleaze. But as uncomfortable as it is to draw
distinctions between highbrow and lowbrow politics, we are worse
off when we avoid making any substantive judgments about how
to police the line between private lives and public performance.
New York Times v. Sullivan358 began as a paean to the need in a
democracy for debate about the public conduct of public officials
to be robust and uninhibited. 359 In time, Sullivan sponsored an
unintended erasure of any difference in the newsworthiness of a
public official’s private doings and public performance, on the thin
theory that everything such officials do is relevant to their
character and fitness for office. 360 Whatever one thinks of this
expansive reading of Sullivan, it bears remembering that even the
Supreme Court acknowledges that private persons should be able
356

See Dolan, supra note 353. I can imagine the case is different if media
investigation uncovers illegal possession of child pornography or possession of
adult pornography that, while lawful to possess privately, may raise relevant
questions of character and judgment. The published list of Judge Bork’s video
rentals contained no X-rated movies. Id.
357
Restatement of Torts (Second) § 652D (1977).
358
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
359
Id. at 279–80.
360
See, e.g., MATT BAI, ALL THE TRUTH IS OUT: THE WEEK POLITICS WENT
TABLOID (2014) (recounting how sensational media coverage of Sen. Gary
Hart’s extramarital affair caused him to drop out of the Democratic primary
campaign in 1988).
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to recover for damage to their reputations without meeting the
Sullivan standard.361
In hindsight, the brouhaha over video rental records seems
quaint, since we now have computers privy to personal information
far more sensitive and extensive. In recent years, Internet
companies have strengthened their privacy policies considerably,
under pressure from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and
nonprofit groups.362 But privacy is still precarious, which leads to
the next suggestion.
C. Opt-in Rather than Opt-out Consent
In 2014, Facebook manipulated the news feeds of nearly
700,000 users without permission, changing the balance of
negative versus positive news to see how the changes affected
people’s emotions and online behavior. 363 At first, Facebook
responded to public outcries by saying that “its [then] 1.28 billion
monthly users gave blanket consent to the company’s research as a
condition of using the service.” 364 One researcher, who is now
taking the lead to consider the ethics of such experiments, told a
reporter that he had “not realize[d] that manipulating the news
feed, even modestly, would make some people feel violated.”365
361

See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 761 (1985); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974).
362
To settle deceptive trade practice complaints, Facebook, Google and
Twitter, among others, signed consent decrees with the FTC in 2012, agreeing to
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declined to make public. See Complaint at 9, In the Matter of Facebook, Inc.,
No. 092 3184, available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
cases/2012/08/120810facebookcmpt.pdf; see also Sundquist, supra note 6, at
173–75; G.S. Hans, Privacy Policies, Terms of Service, and FTC Enforcement:
Broadening Unfairness Regulation for a New Era, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 163, 166, 175–90 (2012).
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N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2014, at B1.
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The notion that checking the proverbial “I agree to the terms of
this service” is a meaningful form of consent is laughable. No
ordinary person reads through all the small print to see if the
agreement does grant Facebook the right to conduct experiments
on its users. What is needed is a fuller use of “opt-in” rather than
“opt-out” mechanisms for consent. When a privacy policy requires
users to take steps to protect their privacy, the default position is
set at making personal information public. By contrast, privacy
becomes the default setting when a user explicitly has to agree to
share information. Some states currently require companies to
obtain explicit or affirmative consent before collecting sensitive
information such as fingerprints or facial scans. 366 However, a
proposed “Bill of Rights” from the White House on consumer data
privacy stops short of recommending that companies obtain
explicit consent from individuals even when collecting health
information on them.367
Many online users may find opt-in consent cumbersome, since
they want to share information and find it inconvenient to take
extra steps to do what they wish.368 This may be so, but the harm
done by opt-out consent seems worse. The default setting on most
browsers enables sites that users have visited to send those
invisible cookies that permit the sites to store visitors’ browsing
histories and to call them up whenever a user revisits.369 This may
be harmless and make for a better Internet experience but it means
One America, Cameras. In the Other, Guns and Diets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2014, at A3.
366
Natasha Singer, White House Proposes Broad Consumer Data Privacy
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2015, at B1.
367
Id. For possible collection of health information through fitness apps, see
supra note 167.
368
“With a trusted website, cookies can enrich your experience by allowing
the site to learn your preferences or allowing you to skip having to sign in every
time you go to the website.” MICROSOFT, Cookies: Frequently Asked Questions,
http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/cookies-faq#1TC=windows-7
(last visited Aug. 29, 2015).
369
For a general description of how cookies work, see MICROSOFT SUPPORT,
Description of Cookies, https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/260971 (last
visited Aug. 29, 2015).
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that our computers exchange information with company computers
in silent and largely invisible ways.370 Apparently, in a world of too
much speech, we are speaking even when we are not. However,
there is an easy technological fix for this. Users can reset a
browser’s default settings so as to require their explicit consent to
receive these cookies.371 For all the annoyance of such steps, the
“incoming cookie alert” would “nudge” us to think about what
personal information we wish to store on a website. 372 In other
words, even without a “right to have information forgotten” of the
European sort, users would already have modest power to make
the forgetting, rather than the remembering, of personal data their
default position when engaging in online commerce.
D. Balancing the Interests of Search Engines and their Audience.
The problem with search engines is not that they provide us too
much search. It is that courts have been granting search engines an
extraordinary level of First Amendment protection, sometimes to
the detriment of the free speech rights of users and website
publishers. In the hierarchy of First Amendment values, the highest
rank goes to speakers who offer opinions on matters of public
importance. 373 As we have seen, many courts and commentators
regard search engines as speakers of this sort, finding that rankings
in search results are, like all ratings, inherently subjective.374
While there is something to this analysis, it favors the interests
of search companies over the potentially competing free speech
interests of online users and web publishers. Google’s First
Amendment position (“we can rank the relevance of various
websites any way we wish, since we are speaking only opinions”)
370
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puts the audience in the position of taking the fairness of Google
search on faith. This is not a strategy for dealing with a large
company controlling nearly two-thirds of the U.S. search market
and 90 percent of the European one.375 The better approach is for
courts to inquire, in particular cases, whether treating search
engines as engaged in “opinion speech” is in fact conducive to the
free speech rights of the audience served by search engines.
E. Reputation, Dignity, and the Right to be Forgotten
A final suggestion is more speculative than the others. Most
critics of too much speech fasten on the loss of privacy to explain
their discomfort. But the loss goes beyond harm to privacy.
American law should follow Europe’s lead in recognizing a
concept of human dignity376 that in appropriate cases might limit
the marketing of personal data.377
Reputation is an essential part of individual dignity, and too
much speech can strip persons of the capacity to remedy mistakes
and earn a new reputation.378 Google’s CEO, Eric Schmidt, writes
of virtual identities being “engraved in perpetuity” as if this were a
good thing.379 But part of what it means to respect the dignity of
human beings is to look upon us as having the potential for growth,
change, and transformation. In John Stuart Mill’s philosophy, we
375

See supra note 7.
The concept of human dignity came into European law following World
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17.
377
“The concept of human dignity is a social one that promotes a humane and
civilized life. The protection of human dignity allows a broader scope of action
[than privacy does] against treating people in intrusive ways . . . .” Lawrence E.
Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity?: Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace, 19 N.
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are all “experiments in living.”380 Search engines link persons to
past events in ways that may or may not capture the present self. In
the U.S., search engines are free to link persons to past stories, no
matter how stale or irrelevant, no matter the damage to reputation.
When reputation is divorced from a person’s ability to change,
then a person is stripped of “the self-presentation [that is part of]
what it means to be a person.”381
At its best, the ECJ decision on a “right to be forgotten” is an
attempt to restore the dignity of reputation to persons. However,
considerable work needs to be done before the “right to be
forgotten” can be acceptable in a First Amendment society. The
most serious problem is that the ECJ decision would require the
removal of links to even truthful information, a position that the
Supreme Court has found difficult to accept in other contexts.382
This Article suggests one principle that could narrow a
person’s “right to be forgotten” and make that right compatible
with the First Amendment, which is to set expiration dates on
personal data, limiting how long such data remains online. As Meg
Ambrose has argued, information had a natural life cycle before
the Internet, and perhaps even as recently as pre-search engine
days.383 Information’s “value depreciate[d] over time” and tended
to fade or be forgotten. 384 Insofar as search engines interrupt that
life cycle and re-present old personal information out of context,
the setting of expiration dates could alleviate the harm.385
380
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1977).
381
Ambrose, supra note 18, at 397 (citing David Velleman); see also J. David
Velleman, The Self as Narrator 56–77 in JOHN CHRISTMAN AND JOEL
ANDERSON, AUTONOMY AND THE CHALLENGES TO LIBERALISM: NEW ESSAYS
(2012).
382
See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (holding right to
broadcast name of rape victim when lawfully found in the public indictment but
leaving open the question of “whether truthful publication of very private
matters unrelated to public affairs could [ever] be constitutionally proscribed”).
383
Ambrose, supra note 18, at 402.
384
Id.
385
For a similar suggestion regarding expiration dates, see MAYERSCHONBERGER, supra note 19, at 183–95.

OCT. 2015]

Searching for Reputation

73

The social desirability of letting information expire varies
considerably with the case. Consider three scenarios: (1) the desire
of the student to have her drunken pirate photograph forgotten;386
(2) the desire of an ex-felon to have public access to his criminal
records expire;387 and (3) the desire of a consumer to have personal
data previously transmitted to Amazon expire.388 I am inclined to
treat Scenario 3 as an easy case. Individuals should have a clear
right to set an expiration date for how long they wish Amazon to
store personal information transmitted as part of a business
transaction. In Scenario 1, even if one accepted that the posting of
a drunken pirate picture was ever relevant to the person’s
qualifications to be a teacher, nevertheless that relevance faded
over time. At some point the harm to the person outweighed any
public interest served by search engine links to sites perpetuating
the photograph.
Scenario 2 is a closer call. Switzerland takes the position that
public access to a criminal record should expire when the
convicted person has served his time. 389 At one point, the
California Supreme Court ruled that a magazine violated an exfelon’s privacy rights by “outing” his eleven-year old record for
burglary. 390 However, the court subsequently changed its
position.391 When it comes to criminal conviction records, even old
information arguably remains relevant to the convict’s neighbors,
prospective employers and others. At the same time, publicity
means the ex-felon will never entirely be able to start anew.
Reasonable people disagree on how to balance these competing

386
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equities.392 But the existence of hard cases should not dissuade us
from advocating expiration dates in Cases 1 and 3.
Uses of expiration dates or so-called “sunset provisions” to
protect privacy and reputation are hardly novel. In fact, the federal
Fair Credit Reporting Act already precludes credit agencies from
reporting negative information about a consumer that is more than
seven years old. 393 There seems to be no reason why similar
expiration norms could not restore to individuals some power over
personal information in the databases of commercial enterprises.
F. Dignity in American Law
As previously stated, post-World War II Europe turned to the
concept of dignity precisely to ground human rights on a source
beyond the vagaries of positive law—the source being the status of
human beings as such. 394 In American parlance, to acknowledge
that a right to dignity’s source lies beyond the Constitution is often
to condemn it as irrelevant to the work of a judiciary tasked with
interpreting a written document.395 However, the concept of human
dignity seems foundational to the entire enterprise of limited
government that the Constitution ordained.
In decisions on sexual intimacy, same-sex preferences, and
same-sex marriage, the concept of human dignity has gained a
foothold in American law, principally through the opinions of
Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy has spoken of the right to marry
as carrying a “dignity and status of immense import.”396 He held
the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional
precisely because it inflicted an “injury and indignity” on same-sex
392
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couples that deprived them of an essential part of liberty. 397 This
line of cases relying on the dignity of marriage culminated in the
Court’s historic 2015 decision, holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires all states to grant same-sex couples the right
to marry.398
Critics regard the concept of dignity as vague and subjective.399
They question what the concept protects beyond what a person’s
liberty and equality already cover. One merit of Justice Kennedy’s
reliance on dignity is that it differentiates what is at stake in samesex marriage cases from the more limited stakes in earlier
decisions about sexual lifestyle.400 In those earlier cases, gays and
lesbians arguably wanted only to be free to be left alone, free from
state interference with intimate sexual choices. But in seeking a
right to marry, same-sex couples demand the dignity that comes
only with public recognition of the equal worth of their unions.
The dignity that comes with public recognition is not a status that
freedom to be left alone can deliver. Instead, social respect is
crucial to maintaining self-respect.401 It is all very well to say that
individuals should have an internal sense of self-esteem. But what
we think of ourselves is often dependent on what people think of
the groups to which we belong.402
Reputation is an essential component of individual dignity.
Self-respect and reputation are not one and the same things.
397
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However, self-respect is hard to achieve when one’s choices in life
no longer determine one’s reputation. This is what the ECJ
decision saw as the root of the problem with unchecked search
engine power. The Spaniard wanted to have his reputation updated
to show he had chosen to take responsibility and to pay off his
debts. Instead he found that search engines rewound the past and
re-presented it as the present, to the detriment of any effective
capacity on the Spaniard’s part to earn back a good reputation.
Persons without power to alter their reputations are persons
without a key aspect of dignity.403
Read in hindsight, the Supreme Court’s first decision
recognizing a right to privacy in the Constitution seems more about
dignity than privacy.404 In striking down a state law that prohibited
even married couples from using contraceptive devices for birth
control purposes, the Court emphasized that the status of marriage
was older than the Constitution and carried with it a “noble
purpose” to the degree of being sacred.405 In tones of indignation,
the Court wondered whether police could enforce the law by
spying on the “sacred precincts” of the marital bedroom. 406 The
decision suggested that the Court found the law positively
indecent, stripping married couples of the dignity to make their
own choices about procreation.
So long as the issues were limited to use or possession of birth
control devices in the martial bedroom, the concept of privacy did
the same work as a concept of dignity. But in time, the Court
expanded its ruling to cover the sale and advertising of
contraceptive devices—hardly “private” matters—and their use by
individuals whether or not married. 407 Yet the Court reached the
same conclusions. Government violates an essential human dignity

403

ZITTRAIN, supra note 239, at 229 (noting that the permanence of online
reputation works against “socially desirable experimental behavior”).
404
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
405
Id. at 485–86.
406
Id. at 486.
407
See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp. 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447–55 (1972).

OCT. 2015]

Searching for Reputation

77

when it takes over decision-making at the heart of what it means to
be responsible for one’s own life.408
While a full survey of references to dignity in American law is
beyond the scope of this paper, we can mention some highlights.409
Dignity underscores an accused’s Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent and the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of stomach
pumping for evidence as “offensive to human dignity.” 410 The
“basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man.” 411 Dignity explains discomfort with
human cloning, selling babies and paying fees to a surrogate
mother (beyond paying medical expenses).412 And it most certainly
goes to whether persons have a constitutional “right to die with
dignity.”413
In a world where information is power, the question of what
rights individuals have to control the migration of personal
information into corporate and government databases is a question
going to the human dignity that attaches to reputation. Fairness to a
person’s reputation is fragile in a world where searching is a new
form of speaking largely controlled by one private corporation, at
most a few, and where that dominance is solidified by First
Amendment doctrines that protect search engine “speeches” to a
remarkable degree. Meanwhile, individuals have little effective
speech against online reputations that may no longer reflect their
present conduct and circumstances.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Three shifts in First Amendment law combine to create the
problem of too much speech. The first is classification of data
408

See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
For surveys of references to dignity in American legal cases, see sources
cited in Gleansy, supra note 399, at 86, n.106.
410
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 174 (1952).
411
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 589 (2005) (O’Connor, J. dissenting).
412
See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON BIOETHICS, Human Cloning and
Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry (2002); REV. CODE WASH. §§ 26.26.01126.26 .903 (2007) (surrogacy contracts allowed but compensation prohibited).
413
Death with Dignity Act, REV. OR. STAT. § 127.800 (2013).
409

78

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 1

collection and marketing as speech activities, no matter how raw,
inarticulate, or private the data. The second is categorization of
search engines as speakers of opinions occupying the highest rung
on the hierarchy of First Amendment values. The third is the overextension of commercial speech doctrine beyond its reasonable
beginnings. That over-extension, together with the other two
developments, elevates commercial speech to a normative position
equal to political speech.
In its decision recognizing an individual’s limited “right to be
forgotten” by search engines doing business in Europe, the ECJ
proposed a new balance between reputation and free speech. For
all its flaws, the ECJ decision is a welcome pushback against the
transfer of power over personal data from individual to data
companies that marks the era of too much speech. This Article has
suggested that use of familiar mechanisms, such as requiring
affirmative consent from individuals before collecting or
marketing their personal information or setting expiration dates on
how long personal data remains in a company’s database, could
reintroduce an appropriate amount of “forgetting” back into the
Internet without harm to the values protected by the First
Amendment.

